



Issues Paper 5

Organisational and Normative Change in the Security Sector

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ISSUES PAPER 5: ORGANISATIONAL AND NORMATIVE CHANGE IN THE SECURITY SECTOR

INTRODUCTION

In *Issues Papers 2, 3 and 4*, we explored how the operating logics, assumptions, dynamics and incentive systems of security organisations as well as different aspects of the legal, social, cultural and political systems in which they are embedded can normalise and entrench the use of torture. This rich systemic understanding of the root causes of torture can assist in laying out some principles for designing a strategy for preventing such practices. Specifically, the root causes can be addressed by transforming the organisations and other aspects systems in which security personnel operate. The question of *how* transformation can actually be catalysed, achieved and sustained is however quite a different one. Transforming organisations and changing cultures or norms, especially when the organisations are complex, closed and embedded in larger political, legal and cultural systems is no simple matter.

This *Issues Paper* reviews the literature on changing the cultures of organisations and on effecting normative change in the context of pathological or destructive norms. In Chapter One we look at research conducted directly on organisational change, drawing out some key principles and practices. Although most of the research on organisational change has taken place in the context of corporations and public sector organisations rather than the security sector, we look at some examples where security organisations have sought to bring about organisational change and the types of principles and practices that they have adopted. In some cases, this includes their application of organisational change theories. Chapter Two then turns to the rich body of research that has been developed in recent years in the field of public health on changing pathological behaviours and the norms that support and sustain them. There are certainly differences between behaviours such as sexual violence or alcoholism on the one hand and torture on the other, the most important difference being that the latter is often driven by political imperatives as opposed to individual ones. Nevertheless, insights in the field of public health, and most particularly those concerning motivation and how norms are shaped and reshaped can supplement our prevention toolkit.

CHAPTER ONE: ORGANISATIONAL CHANGE THEORY AND PRACTICE

“In the final analysis, change sticks when it becomes “the way we do things around here,” when it seeps into the bloodstream of the corporate body. Until new behaviours are rooted in social norms and shared values, they are subject to degradation as soon as the pressure to change is removed.”¹

In Chapter Three of *Issues Paper 2: Exploring the Root Causes of Torture*, we drew on criminological and sociological theory to develop a way of thinking about the cultural dimension of security organisations. Let us now look more broadly at how organisational theory and organisational change practitioners have thoughts about this concept of organisational culture.

In an article summarising lessons learned from his involvement in hundreds of efforts to bring about fundamental changes in corporations worldwide, the Harvard based organisational change guru John Kotter concludes that a few have been successful, a few utter failures, and most have fallen at the lower end towards failure. Given the enormous amount of money and effort that has gone into transforming corporations to improve their performance and to assist them to shift their operations to meet the imperatives of changing environments, this conclusion is sobering. Nevertheless, if we consider these many attempts to better align corporations and public sector organisations with economic circumstances, public expectations and legal and policy environments as experiments in organisational change, we can draw on the data that they have yielded to identify what works and the traps into which change efforts are likely to fall.

The Cultural Dimensions of Organisational Change

When people speak about transforming organisations, they often refer to the importance of changing the ‘organisational culture’. Presumably, what they have in mind here is something other than the ‘hardware’ of organisations, which might include, amongst other things, their rules and practices concerning recruitment, promotion and discipline, their economic model and pay scales, their management structures, their physical premises, their uniforms (if official) and the legal regulations under which they operate. Indeed, organisational culture is often thought of as a type of substrate that underpins all of these more explicit forms of organisation – a substrate that we need to reach if we are to effect authentic and sustainable transformation, but that often eludes us. As one senior police leader in Nepal said in the course of our work, “it is not so hard to change structures, but changing a culture of an organisation is a much harder thing to do”.²

Culture in the context of an organisation can be defined as ‘a pattern of shared basic assumptions that was learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way you perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems’.³ More simply it can be defined as “shared values that inform organisational members about how to behave appropriately”.⁴ Two aspects of these definitions are particularly important for our purposes. First, they recognise that culture is multidimensional, that is, it operates at a number of levels. Thus, the practices and structures of the organisation that we mentioned above are not separate from, but constitute the external dimensions of culture. Besides these obvious ‘hardware’ dimensions, culture resides in the symbols, rituals and ceremonies that are historically transmitted, as well as more routine aspects of life such as language and stories. Each of these dimensions shape people’s knowledge, behaviour and understanding. Second, organisational cultures are not some type of aesthetic window dressing that could be separated out from the more instrumental dimensions of organisations. Rather, they developed as part of the way in which organisations have historically solved problems. This means that for the people inside the organisation, culture is not simply a symbolic layer that could be stripped away, leaving their more rational and strategic practices in place. The two dimensions are woven through each other. The failure to recognise how culture is tied up with the operational dimensions of an organisation is likely to lead those seeking to effect cultural change to overlook the sources and sites of resistance and opposition to their efforts.

To these definitions drawn from the organisational change literature, we would add what is perhaps the most oft quoted definition of culture from the anthropological literature. That is Clifford Geertz’s notion that “man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he himself has spun, I take culture to be those webs”.⁵

¹ John P. Kotter, “Leading Change: Why Transformation Efforts Fail,” *Harvard Business Review* 73, no. 2 (1995): 67.

² Interview, Navaraj Dhakal, AIG Nepal Police, Kathmandu, April 11th, 2014.

³ Edgar H. Schein, *Organizational Culture and Leadership* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004), 7.

⁴ Alicia Boisnier and Jennifer Chatman, “The Role of Subcultures in Agile Organisations,” *Working Paper (Harvard Business School. Division of Research)* 2, no. 91 (2002): 32.

⁵ Clifford Geertz, *The interpretation of cultures: selected essays* (New York: Basic Books, 1973), 5.

The importance of this admittedly highly complex understanding of culture is that it highlights the fact that what is most distinct about culture is that it concerns *meaning* and how human beings make and remake meaning, which in turn shapes how they make sense of the world. Meaning of course does not float above the world, or exist in people's heads as some type of force that then shapes the actual world. Rather it is embedded in those dimensions of an organisation discussed above, such as its structures, its laws, the language people use, the stories that they tell and the clothes that they wear. Culture is transmitted or transformed through these practices and structures. But the distinct 'value add' of culture lies in what the people who adopt those practices make them mean and in how those practice in turn shape the way in which those same people make sense of themselves and what they are doing. Thus for instance, different types of duties within an organisation will be differentially valued because of transmitted hierarchies of value (meaning). For example, being tough on criminals may be considered a higher status activity than working on family disputes. Another example would be higher pay scales for the jobs that men in an organisation do compared to those that women do or the presence of a vastly higher proportion of men in leadership positions. In both cases, one can say that the existing systems of meaning lead to the different types of activities or men's and women's roles being valued differentially. At the same time, the fact that those roles attract different levels of social capital and even different pay recreates and perpetuates those hierarchies of value.

How Do We Think Organisational Change Occurs?

Traditionally, a dominant way in which the process of change has been understood in the management literature is according to the 'linear' model.⁶ Here we imagine that change can be planned from a rational and external analysis of the organisation and that it will then follow a predictable path according to a strategy and its implementation. This model adopts a progressive series of steps that might include goal setting, analysis, evaluation, selection and the planning of implementation followed by implementation. It assumes that organisational cultures are like objects or dependent variables that can be understood and manipulated by introducing new independent variables and that the culture that is the object of the intervention will respond in predictable ways.

There are several problems with this approach. Organisations are complex, cultures multi-dimensional and as noted above, culture is better understood as a web of significance than as an object that can be manipulated. Moreover, as we will discuss below, the people in the organisation cannot simply be lifted out of the existing paradigm and dropped into a new one. Any change process always has to take place with people in already existing settings, with already existing understandings, habitual ways of acting and patterns of meaning.

In this regard, Johnson's discussion of the dimensions that make up organisational culture is illuminating.⁷ These are paradigms, control systems, organisational structures, power structures, symbols rituals and myths and routines. Let us focus on two of these to illustrate both the nature of organisational culture and the process of cultural change.

The Importance and Challenges of Changing A Paradigm

Johnson's paradigmatic dimension maps well onto what Chan called axiomatic knowledge in her inventory of the dimensions of cultural knowledge described in *Issues Paper 2: Exploring the Root Causes of Torture*. Recall, Chan argued that axiomatic knowledge is the most important level at which change must occur if it is to be deep and sustained. Specifically, she argues that of the five types of knowledge, shifts in axiomatic knowledge are the ones that drive change. In terms of policing for example, cultural change involves re-examining the rationale and purpose of policing, then formulating a new strategic direction and setting in place the organisation processes for implementing change. This explains why, for example, some change strategies in policing have involved changing the name from a police *force* to a police *service*, presumably to seek to capture this basic *raison d'être*.

Johnson has some important insights into why paradigms are so difficult to shift. First, he defines paradigm as a "generalised set of beliefs about the organisation and the way it is or should be" and concludes that, "since it is taken for granted and not problematic, [it] may be difficult to surface as a coherent statement".⁸ That is, even though the paradigm ultimately steers the culture, it is rarely evident or made explicit, especially to those within the organisation.

⁶ Ellen E. Chaffee, "Three models of strategy," *Academy of Management Review* 10, no. 1 (1985): 89-98.

⁷ Gerry Johnson, "Rethinking Incrementalism," *Strategic Management Journal* 9 (1998): 75-91.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 85.

Moreover, any strategies for change that are introduced into the organisations are likely to be integrated into the existing paradigm or, if they cannot be integrated into the paradigm, resisted. This points to the importance of developing strategies that are both continuous with and at the same time able to bring subtle shifts to existing understandings and practices. This is discussed below. In the research conducted for this project, we sought to develop an understanding of this axiomatic dimension of culture by explicitly asking people inside and outside security organisations what they thought the basic role or purpose of the organisation was, or what an ideal member of the organisation would be like. We also sought to discover it by observing how personnel behaved and the types of understandings they seemed to take for granted.

Johnson's second insight is that paradigms do not exist as some type of abstract set of beliefs but are maintained and legitimised in a 'cultural web' of practices. That is, they are carried by or transmitted through the other dimensions of the organisational culture – its myths, rituals, symbols, control systems and formal and informal power structures, all of which keep in existence the paradigmatic beliefs. Accordingly, a cultural change strategy needs to track these various dimensions.

Third, and relatedly, the paradigm comprises a set of mutually supportive and reinforcing propositions. As such, it cannot be shifted or dismantled by addressing a single aspect of the organisation or a single set of beliefs. Rather, change always has to be occurring at multiple levels if it is not simply to be undone because the culture is maintained at other levels, which in turn undo the changes at the level of intervention. This point is critical to our overall project and echoes the ecological model discussed above. For example, a cultural change strategy that sought to address disparities in the treatment of women in the organisation by equalising pay, but that did not ensure that women were in leadership positions would not be sufficient to change the culture around gender.

Fourth, and critically for any project that is seeking to bring about significant change, the constructs of the paradigm are closely linked to the power structures in the organisation. In other words, it is likely that those with most power in an organisation are most directly involved in operationalising the paradigm. The reason this matters is that most change strategies seek to convince leaders of the need for change by producing rational explanations of how it will lead to better outcomes. This may be true, but to the extent that leaders' own positions are embedded in and supported by the existing paradigm, changes to that paradigm may represent a threat to their survival. This explains why some change strategies actually require building new leadership or why, where this is not possible, or only partially possible, one needs to be strategic in both finding ways to bring the existing leadership on board, or working with their resistance.

The Symbolic Dimension of Organisational Culture

The second dimension worthy of particular note in thinking about change strategies is that of 'symbols, rituals and myths'. For our purposes, we might define symbols as the 'objects, events, acts or people that convey, maintain or create meaning over and above their functional purpose' and rituals as the activities or events that emphasise, highlight or reinforce what is especially important in the culture.⁹ This dimension is, as already noted above, not distinct from the paradigm or the culture, but the dimension through which paradigm and culture are woven and carried. Various researchers have shown how organisational stories and myths, rituals and ceremonies and the language of organisations legitimise and preserve existing core beliefs and assumptions.¹⁰ The importance of symbols, rituals and myths lies partly in the fact that they provide an organisation with its identity and meaning across time, linking the organisation and those working within it with its history. Symbols, rituals and myths are also critical insofar as they hold and sustain the distinctive meaning and values of the organisation.

That symbols, myths and rituals are a critical dimension of organisational culture was well recognised by a commission established to transform the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in Northern Ireland in the face of a history of systematic human rights violations. The Independent Commission on Policing was established to examine the problems with the police force and recommend changes. The Commission specifically found that the 'words and symbols' of the RUC were associated with one side of the conflict (the British state and unionist community), that they had become politicised and as such, that these words and symbols needed to change if there was to be a broader transformation of the police force into one that represented all communities equally.¹¹

⁹ Gerry Johnson, Kevan Scholes and Richard Whittington, *Exploring Corporate Strategy* (Pearson Education Limited, 2008), 198-199.

¹⁰ Chaffee, "Three models," 89-98; John W. Meyer and Brian Rowan, "Institutionalized Organizations: Formal Structure as Myth and Ceremony," *American Journal of Sociology* 83 (1977): 340-63.

¹¹ Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland, *A New Beginning: Policing in Northern Ireland - The Report of the Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland* (Belfast: Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland, 1999).

Changes recommended and subsequently implemented included renaming the RUC the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), introducing a new oath where personnel pledged their loyalty to uphold human rights rather than an allegiance to the British crown and changing the crest to include 'equally British, Irish and Northern Irish symbols, rather than the highly contested crown and harp of the RUC'.¹² As Lamb argues in her analysis of the change strategies, such symbols and other aspects of the ritual and symbolic environment powerfully linked the organisation with 'folk memories of the wider Protestant/Loyalist, Unionist community' and the RUC identity of protecting this "innocent and misrepresented community" against terrorism.¹³ She documents the fierce attachment that RUC officers had to their existing symbols and rituals as a sign of their importance in anchoring the organisation in its historical, but problematic cultural identity.

A particular aspect of this symbolic or ritual dimension worthy of note is the type of language that people within an organisation use. In the major inquiry into racial discrimination in the London Metropolitan Police Service, for example, one of the findings was that racist values were transmitted through so-called 'canteen culture', that is 'the small talk between police at the operational level'.¹⁴ So, for example, when an officer saw a black person driving a nice car he might remark, "I wonder who he robbed to get that?"¹⁵

A number of empirical studies where the researchers looked closely at how people became torturers, including studies of torturers in Brazil and Greece showed the important role that language and terms of arts played in forming in-groups or sub-cultures in which torture came to be normalised.¹⁶ In his encyclopedic study of the transmission of torture techniques, Rejali has similarly discussed the ways in which the transmission of special practices and specialist languages create in-groups that then normalise torture:

"Informal apprenticeship has other advantages in recruitment and secrecy. Soldiers and doctors who might balk at being involved in torture can be drawn into it in small steps until they are as implicated in it as much as anybody else (Goldstein and Breslin 1986: 14-19). Such practices also tie torturers together in bonds of secrecy and fraternity (Huggins et al 2002). Apprenticeship also creates regional argot for torture, "a language with new words and expressions so that they can talk about various things without being understood by outsiders" (Mohammad 1992: 4)."¹⁷

As in the Northern Irish case, the adoption of ritualised languages of how people talk about torture, torture instruments or victims solidifies the relationships between those who belong to the in-group, also shielding them from transformation through outside influences or interventions. Transformation from the inside of such sub-cultures thus would seem to be an important lever in preventing the practices that they sanction.

Key Principles and Practices for Achieving Cultural Change in Organisations

Looking at the literature on cultural change in organisations, particularly in closed environments such as policing or the military, several principles and practices seem to be critical in effectively transforming the culture of organisations. These are articulated below in distinct categories, but obviously they work best in combination.

a) The importance of leadership

In the organisational change literature, some have argued that leadership is the most important factor.¹⁸ Literature on police reform in particular stresses the importance of leadership. A study commissioned by the Vera Institute for example found that the most important factor in altering a police culture was the leadership of the Commanding Officer:

¹² Michele Lamb, "A Culture of Human Rights: Transforming Policing in Northern Ireland," *Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice* 2, no. 3 (2008): 389.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Sir William Macpherson, *Stephen Lawrence Inquiry; Report of an Inquiry by Sir William Macpherson of Cluny* CM 4262-1 (London: HMSO, 1999), 6.28.

¹⁵ Ibid., 6.12.

¹⁶ Martha K. Huggins, Mika Haritos-Fatouros and Phillip G. Zimbardo, *Violence Workers, Police Torturers and Murderers Reconstruct Brazilian Atrocities* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002); Mika Haritos-Fatouros, *The psychological origins of institutionalized torture* (London & New York: Routledge, 2003).

¹⁷ Rejali, *Torture and Democracy*, 462. References in original text.

¹⁸ Nigel King, "Modeling the innovation process: An empirical comparison of approaches," *Journal of Occupational and Organizational Psychology* 65, no. 2 (1992): 89-100; Junseob Shin and George, E. McClomb, "Top executive leadership and organizational innovation: An empirical investigation of nonprofit human services organizations (HSOs)," *Administration in Social Work* 22, no. 3 (1998): 1-21.

“Both COs [commanding officers] improved the way that precinct personnel and community relations were managed...They administered the departmental monitoring programs for recidivist officers with zeal, attaching real consequences to receiving civilian complaints. In both precincts, officers had gotten the message that abusive behavior could be hazardous to their careers. In effect, the COs in the two precincts we investigated took a departmental policy and used it to further their vision of how police ought to interact with the public.”¹⁹

Similarly, in its report on the organisational cultural transformation of policing in Toronto, the Ontario Human Rights Commission stressed the importance of unified, committed and involved leadership and that leaders follow through with action on their commitments. It also insisted that leadership not be understood as existing only at the top of an organisation, but that leaders could and should be located at different levels and in different parts of the organisation. A related concept developed by the Ontario Human Rights Commission and identified in this research is that such leaders must have specialised knowledge and skills to catalyse change at the same time as having an intimate understanding of the operations and culture of the organisation.

The need for leadership at multiple levels is emphasised by Chan, who insists that while leadership is important, the type of leadership we are talking about ‘is necessary from every level and every division of the organisation, not simply from the top. Obviously, the organisation must “create a suitably supportive climate to encourage and reward such leadership”.’²⁰

A study of the transformation of the police force in Durban, South Africa, also highlights the importance of leadership, in particular leadership in the field where officers are actually operating.²¹ Frontline leaders, who are able to closely supervise the behaviour of officers are seen in the policing literature as occupying perhaps the most important location in the organisation. At the same time, Marks emphasises that front line leaders need to engage those who are part of their team through, for example, discussion of problems and reflecting on how to tackle them. Balancing these imperatives of leadership and collaboration with the rank and file, Marks argues that what is required is a broader organisational transformation towards more participatory forms of management. This finding leads to the importance of the relational forms of leadership we will discuss in the next chapter.²²

Consistent and clear leadership, importantly not only in words, but in actions is seen as absolutely critical in all literature on organisational change.²³ Still, one should be cautious of prescriptions that place too much emphasis on the role of the leadership and the apparently magical belief in the capacity of the charismatic leader. As Schein points out, this view is based on the problematic assumption that leaders somehow stand outside organisations and all of their dynamics whereas, it is more accurate to say that leaders both constitute and are constituted by the organisation. As he argues, “Leaders create cultures, but cultures, in turn, create their next generation of leaders”.²⁴

b) Reform must be motivated from below and within

While the support of top management is crucial, everyone in the organisation must feel that they have a stake in change. No matter how powerfully leaders insist on change, it will not occur without the involvement and investment of the people who make up the organisation. As police expert David Bayley insists, “the grain of the organisation must be made to work with, and not against, reform”.²⁵ This also means that the change strategies have to be prepared to undertake the time-consuming work of consulting personnel to get their views and to appreciate their concerns.

Examining the principles of transformation in police culture, O’Neill draws on some of the basic principles of organisational change developed by the guru of the field, John Kotter.²⁶ Kotter insists that reform cannot be simply ‘decreed’ from above and that even as leadership is a critical factor in organisational change, there must be broad and deep support. Building on this idea, Kotter advises that while the support of top management is crucial, everyone in the force must feel that they have a stake in the change. Establishing a sense of urgency

¹⁹ Robert C. Davis and Pedro Mateu-Gelabert, “Respectful and Effective Policing: Two Examples in the South Bronx,” *Vera Institute of Justice March* (1999): 20.

²⁰ Chan, 2000, *op. cit.*, p. 237.

²¹ Monique Marks, *Transforming the Robocops: Changing police in South Africa* (Scottsville: University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2005)

²² Marks, *Transforming Robocops*.

²³ John P. Kotter, *Leading Change* (Cambridge: Harvard Business Press, 1996)

²⁴ Schien, *Organizational Culture and Leadership*, 313.

²⁵ David H. Bayley, *Democratizing the Police Abroad: What To Do and How To Do It* (Washington: National Institute of Justice, 2001), 20.

²⁶ William G. O’Neill, *Police Reform and Human Rights* (New York: Hurst, 2004).

and creating a coalition of management and employees are both crucial elements for implementing change. Studies on successful cultural change in organisations consulted as part of our research similarly indicate that developing an approach from the bottom up, for example, through involving all staff in the process of developing interventions, is critical to success.

An interesting example here is the process that was undertaken to reform a Scottish psychiatric hospital, specifically to align its operation with human rights principles. Two processes used in this case may be of particular interest to us. First, to work out what needed to be changed, an audit involving all staff and patients was carried out. The advantage of this was that staff were themselves the source of ideas about what needed to be changed and how. Second, this audit led to practices being coded with a red, amber or green light in terms of human rights. As well as involving staff in the process and giving them a sense of ownership of it, all staff learned more about what human rights involved and meant in practice.

More specifically in the policing context, in a study of efforts to implement community policing, Rachel Neild found that regular rank and file police personnel themselves rather than outside 'experts' or those high up in the police hierarchy were often the source of the most useful ideas.²⁷ At the same time, this 'bottom-up approach' must be combined with skillful and committed leadership who set clear standards on what is proper behaviour and what will not be tolerated in the new police.²⁸

c) Reform must occur in a way that can be assimilated by the organisation and taken up by personnel

Because ultimately organisational change can only occur to the extent that the men and women within the organisation transform their practices, it must take place in a way that they can accept and assimilate. In this regard it is critical to anticipate and work with the receptivity and resistance that those actual people are likely to experience. Organisational change can raise difficult feelings and experiences for personnel, including a sense of personal loss, feelings of inadequacy and a sense that they lack of competence. The result can be a loss of self-confidence and frustration because they find themselves unfamiliar with the new demands. As Austin and Claassen argue, 'While people in organisations are able to change, adapt, learn, and unlearn as they find new ways to operate within their workspace, it is important to understand how staff experience change and the methods used for increasing staff acceptance and support of change'.²⁹

This being the case, several approaches can be adopted to minimise these sources of resistance:

- The change should be simple;
- It should be as similar as possible to previous practices and linked with those practices so that personnel can make the links;
- The advantage of change should be clearly articulated and understood;
- Change should be rolled out in stages or small steps;
- The benefits of the change should be readily observable to those being asked to implement the change.

Looking at the empirical evidence on what has and has not worked in organisational change, Austin and Claassen underline the importance of providing space for personnel to express and work with their fears and concerns, at the same time as recognising the positive possibilities change might bring. Precisely because success is dependent on people adopting new attitudes, behaviours and skills, it is critical to minimise defensiveness. As they put it, "[I]t is the defensive and adaptive tendencies that sustain the status quo and usually block learning and change. For staff, the psychological aspect of change can also involve emotional and cognitive loss similar to the experiences of death and dying."³⁰

One variable that will influence the degree to which change will be embraced is the readiness of personnel. As Robbins and his co-researchers put it, "readiness is likely to be a major factor in determining whether an innovation will be effectively implemented and sustained".³¹ Three factors will be particularly important here. First, personnel must see it as necessary for the change to occur. Second, they must see that the particular

²⁷ Rachel Neild, *Police Training: Themes and Debates in Public Security Reform: A Manual for Civil Society* (Washington, DC: Washington Office on Latin America, 1998).

²⁸ O'Neill, *Police Reform*, 10.

²⁹ Michael J. Austin and Jennette Claassen, "Impact of Organizational Change on Organizational Culture: Implications for Introducing Evidence-Based Practice," *Journal of Evidence-Based Social Work* 5, no. 1/2 (2008): 332.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 333.

³¹ Vestena Robbins et al., "Evaluating school readiness to implement positive behavioral supports," *Journal of Applied School Psychology* 20, no. 1 (2003): 53.

changes being introduced at appropriate in the current situation. Third, they must feel that they are agents of the change rather than having the change imposed on them.

In this regard, Roger's work on diffusion of innovation distinguishes some of the features of a strategy that will assist in ensuring the sustainability of change. Rogers identified the following five major characteristics in the context of sustaining and diffusing innovations:

1. *Relative advantage*. The perceived advantage that the change has over the current practice. Various stakeholders affected by the change may view the relative advantage of a particular change differently;
2. *Compatibility*. The similarity between the change and the previous practice. The more consistent the change is with prior work, the higher likelihood the change will be sustained;
3. *Complexity*. The simplicity of implementing the change determines its sustainability. Simple changes are more likely to be adopted than complex ones;
4. *Trial-ability*; the ability of the change to be implemented in stages rather than in its entirety;
5. *Observability*; Changes where the immediate effects are seen and experienced by the workers will be implemented faster and potentially sustained longer.³²

In practical terms what this points to is the importance of adopting a strategy that grounds change processes in the organisation itself as well as through allies outside the organisation. Specifically, the process of reforming security forces in a post-conflict context requires allies and champions within the forces themselves, in other state agencies (including political parties, members of parliament and the judiciary), in allied sectors (such as members of the legal profession and judicial medical officers) and amongst the broader public. This is true in the institutional sense, insofar as the various actors will directly influence institutional reform (for example by refusing to admit certain types of evidence that may be obtained using unethical practices, supporting legislative reforms to discourage judicial acceptance of this type of evidence and so on). It is also true in the more amorphous cultural sense, insofar as norms concerning acceptable and unacceptable police behaviour are generated and sustained not only within the organisation itself, but also in the broader society of which it is a part.

As noted above, literature on organisational culture emphasises that there is a permeable relationship between the external and internal cultures. Crelinsten, for example, insists that patterns of thinking and the meaning attributed to different social groups throughout society "allows the reality construction to spread into more and more spheres of political and social life until it is sufficiently anchored in law, custom and discourse to define what is right and wrong, what is permissible and what is not".³³ Chan similarly argues that attempts to alter policing practices must entail not only changes in the structure of accountability and to cultural orthodoxies within police, but must also attend to the wider field.³⁴

d) *Change must occur in different dimensions*

Approaching the question of cultural change in a manner that tracks the dimensions of policing organisations set out in Chapter Three of *Issues Paper 2: Exploring the Root Causes of Torture*, Chan suggests paying attention to three aspects of cultural change:

- The *content* of change—the need to define 'good police practice' so that traditional police cultural knowledge can be replaced with 'professional' cultural knowledge
- The *process* of change—the need to establish a workplace that rewards problem solving and innovation rather than mistake avoidance;
- *Structural* changes—the need for the establishment of a range of related mechanisms ('law reform; external and internal monitoring systems; quality reviews; reward and accountability structures; the empowerment of citizens; and even a shift of certain policing functions from the state to civil society') to apply continuing external pressure to change.³⁵

Below we set out some case studies where organisational change designed to improve respect for human rights have been attempted in security organisations.

³² Everett M. Rogers, *Diffusion of Innovations 4th Ed* (New York: Free Press, 1995).

³³ Crelinsten, "The world of torture," 303.

³⁴ Chan, "Backstage Punishment," 105.

³⁵ Janet Chan, *Changing Police Culture: Policing in a Multicultural Society* (Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 232-238.

CASE STUDIES

Reform of the Ontario Police Force, Canada

Between 2007 and 2010, the Ontario Police Force worked in collaboration with the Ontario Human Rights Commission to develop and implement a comprehensive human rights organisational reform strategy.³⁶

The report asks, as many security organisations are likely to be asking, 'Why change?' No organisation is going to successfully shift its culture and modes of operation unless people in the organisation see a compelling reason to do so. In this case, three main reasons were given. First, in increasingly diverse societies, human rights and the respect for every individual upon which they rest, offer the best hope for dealing with the conflicts this diversity is bound to generate. Second, members of the public feel more confident in dealing and partnering with police and are more likely to respect, trust, and cooperate with police services when they feel the police respect their individual rights. Third, police services have had increasing numbers of human rights complaints over the last several years, which can be expensive to defend and resolve.

One of the key conclusions drawn from this process is that organisational change ultimately depends on local leadership and decisions based on local needs and organisational cultures.

Several components were found to be particularly critical:

- A comprehensive organisational change approach, one that considered all aspects of the work and structure of the organisation, was required. At the same time, an organisation needs to focus on key areas. The Ontario Police Service Human Rights Project targeted numerous organisational areas and functions, including recruitment, selection and promotion, staff training, public education, and performance management and accountability. They noted in particular that human rights change should not be cordoned off as a distinct process but needed to take place at the heart of all organisational processes;
- A unified, committed and involved leadership not just at the top but also throughout the organisation. Leaders must consistently communicate that change is needed, that they are committed to it, that they will commit resources to it, and that they will themselves be involved in assessing and guiding the effort;
- Empowered and capable change agents. Such change agents should be prominently positioned in the reporting hierarchy, supported by specialists, include high-level staff and be strongly supported by senior leadership;
- An articulated vision and shared terminology. It was particularly important for change agents to assume and use clear and consistent language and a shared vision of where the organisation wanted to go and why;
- A multi-stakeholder structure and process for change. Stakeholders need to represent groups inside and outside the organisation and will be critical in addressing resistance;
- Ongoing monitoring and evaluation. Clearly articulated SMART (Specific, Measurable, Actionable, Realistic and Time bound) human rights organisational change goals and desired outcomes need to be established at the start of the project;
- Ongoing communication and reporting. Plan for and execute transparent, accessible and regular reporting on project progress, to the organisation and the public;
- Identifying and planning for resistance. Anticipate, acknowledge and respond to resistance and the perceptions underlying it, through consistent and firm communication by senior leadership and through risk management planning at the start of the project. At the same time, do not try to convince everyone of the merit of human rights organisational change efforts. By supporting existing and potential "champions" and allies rather than a small minority of immovable detractors you are more likely to succeed.

³⁶ See Ontario Human Rights Commission, *Human rights and policing: creating and sustaining organizational change* (Toronto: Ontario Human Rights Commission, 2011).

The reform of the Northern Ireland Police

The Northern Ireland Police has undergone one of the most significant reform processes in the world, involving a wholesale reorientation. It is worth noting some of the key dimensions of change.

The RUC has changed its name to the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), uniform, flag and insignia. A new code of ethics and pledge were introduced. Independent human rights expert advisors to the force were appointed. Officers are being trained and educated in international and domestic human rights. Mechanisms to promote transparency and democratic accountability *vis-a-vis* the local community have been established through the Policing Board and District Policing Partnerships (DPPs). Human rights compliance is being monitored and regular progress reports issued, and the PSNI holds regular community-based meetings. Most importantly, an affirmative action recruitment policy was introduced towards achieving equality between the Catholic and Protestant communities in the force. Such measures are concerned with ensuring that the PSNI fully and unequivocally meets national and international human rights standards so as to build trust in the force as an impartial upholder of law and human rights for both communities.³⁷

In this process, however, it was recognised that it was not enough to shift external processes and formal rules – there had to be a change in the way that the police understood what they did. Policing was at its core about the protection of human rights and not protecting the state from terrorism. In the case of the Northern Ireland police under the name RUC, there was a deeply entrenched identity as the protectors of a particular community against terrorism.

This was achieved along three dimensions:

1. Altering the symbolic environment. This was achieved first by broadening the recruitment base to include a more diverse force and second by ensuring that the symbols of the organisation such as flags and insignias were those embraced equally by all communities;
2. Develop cultural capacities. This was based on the notion developed by Swindler that rather than thinking of culture as enduring values, we would do well to think of culture as driving “social change by furnishing a range of capacities for action that can be mobilised to achieve new objectives” (Swindler 1995). In other words, human rights ideas come to be operationalised as tools that allow for different types of actions.
3. Diffuse the boundary between human rights communities and police communities. Noting that identity is largely built through boundary making, the idea here is to try to break down this boundary through exposure and working together.

Police Reform in NSW, Australia

This case provides a good illustration of the dangers of a change approach that places too much emphasis on formal training.³⁸ Reform through training is possible, but realising its fruits requires overcoming various obstacles. The new recruit-training curriculum introduced into the NSW Police had some success in laying the foundation for a new model of policing and with it, a new conception of professionalism. The model was community policing, which emphasises preventive policing, maintenance of order and local accountability. It was a direct challenge to the doxa of traditional policing, that police work is about crime fighting, catching crooks and physical coercion. The training set out to subvert the traditional model by raising consciousness about ethics, the social and legal context of policing, and the prejudices recruits bring to the job. It also constructed a model of good police work based on the ideal of a professional and reflective practitioner.

The Police Academy curriculum stayed fairly close to the objective of implementing this ideal, and had had some success in ‘liberalising’ or at least containing unprofessional attitudes. The same cannot be said of the field-training component. Recruits who joined the police generally brought with them the assumption that policing was about crime fighting, and it did not take long for them to start repeating the mantra that the training phase had been about ‘warm and fuzzy stuff’ and quite irrelevant to ‘real’ policing. Their contact with ‘seniors’ in the academy and with operational police during later phases of their training no doubt reinforced this criticism at an

³⁷ Lamb, “Culture of Human Rights,” 389.

³⁸ See Chan, *Police Culture*; Chan, “Organizational Socialization”; Janet Chan and David Dixon, “The Politics of Police Reform: Ten years after the Royal Commission into the New South Wales Police Service,” *Criminology and Criminal Justice* 7, no. 4 (2007): 443-468.

early stage in their careers. The section of the project that comprised a year of on-the-job training among operational police hardened probationers' attitudes against the training.

Nevertheless, the 'lessons' of the Police Academy were not totally lost. There was still a high degree of identification with communication skills as an important indicator of 'good police work,' and recruits had become more conscious of corruption issues and were showing a greater willingness to formally report certain types of misconduct to the police service.

This suggests that where training curricula are backed up by organisational policies, training objectives are more likely to be realised. The converse is also suggested by this case study: where training curricula are at odds with organisational policies or the realities of the job, training objectives are likely to be frustrated. The bridging of that divide is therefore a matter not only of linking theory to practice – although that is an important prerequisite – but also establishing some kind of consensus throughout the organisation about 'why things are done the way they are'. Debating and negotiating axiomatic knowledge is the key to changing organisational culture, because axiomatic knowledge defines the organisation's 'purpose, its strategic intention, its design and characteristics of preferred members'. Once organisational processes are set up to implement the new axiomatic knowledge, changes in other dimensions of cultural knowledge will follow.

CHAPTER TWO: CHANGING NORMS AND VIOLENT BEHAVIOUR: THE PUBLIC HEALTH EXPERIENCE³⁹

One of the principal aims of this project was to develop methods for altering peoples attitudes, the norms they embrace and their behaviours in ways that would prevent their committing or supporting the use of torture. To achieve this, we felt that it was important to have a firm grasp on the types of strategies and interventions that have been effective in bringing about attitudinal, normative and behavioural change. We were especially interested in best practice models in education for cultural and normative change. In this chapter, we look at some of the key findings about 'what works' in normative and behavioural change programs. We then provide an overview of some types of programs and approaches that may be of particular interest in the context of security organisations. To commence, we discuss why we decided to look at the cognate field of public health.

The Value of Public Health Approaches to Normative and Behavioural Change

In the field of human rights, there exists very little research or sharing of practitioner experience on how to transform attitudes, values or the subjective norms that underpin behaviour. Certainly, there is a great deal of attention to what types of norms people ought to hold, and on pointing out how certain behaviours or norms violate human rights. But norms are generally approached objectively, with little attention to the psychological, motivational or social factors shaping how individuals and groups form their norms or change them. As we detail in our report on human rights education and training in the security sector, the overwhelming emphasis there is on imparting information about human rights principles and laws.⁴⁰ Indeed, although training manuals often open with a strong rhetorical affirmation of the necessity of changing attitudes/values and skills as well as knowledge, very little that follows in the substantive content or process of the training attends to attitudinal, value or behavioural change, other than as artefacts of changes in knowledge.⁴¹

In the cognate field of public health, by contrast, a great deal of effort has gone into working out how to change people's values and attitudes and shifting normatively problematic behaviours, such as sexual or gender based violence. Correlatively, public health scholars have studied such interventions to find out what works and why. Moreover, unlike human rights interventions, in developing their interventions and theories public health practitioners and theorists have liberally drawn on socio-psychological theories that seek to explain how people's values and attitudes are constituted and how they can be changed. In this chapter we survey some of the most relevant ideas and resources from this field with a view to seeing what we can draw from them to take back to our own work in preventing torture.

Before entering into this literature, however, some qualification is in order. One does need to exercise caution in moving from experiences changing the types of norms and behaviours with which public health is concerned - for example, drug and alcohol abuse or violence against women - and preventing torture by security forces. Although in both cases we seem to be addressing behaviours that are normatively condemned and in many cases involve violence, the behaviours that are the target of the different fields are different in some important respects. The most obvious difference is that torture occurs within the context of a set of policies of the security organisation in which an individual is located and in many cases will be mandated, implicitly or explicitly, by the authorities. To put it in stark terms, while the decision to drink or sexually assault is an individual decision (albeit possibly shaped by other social factors), the decision to use force within the scope of one's work may be driven by a range of institutional factors over which the individual has little or no control.

At the same time, the differences should not be overdrawn. One of the important findings of this project is that the traditional picture of torture as an act committed under the command of political authorities in order to obtain information or intimidate opposition is far too narrow to capture the many instances and types of torture that in fact occur as a matter of routine in police and military custody. As discussed in *Issues Paper 2: Exploring the Root Causes of Torture*, the use of torture is not simply the outcome of political orders, but also results from certain cultural and social understandings of the use of violence, norms and beliefs about the worth of certain social groups and a range of individual and situational factors that normalise and routinise violence. Dynamics discussed in that such as dehumanisation, discrimination, the routinisation of violence, compliance and conformity, the assertion and abuse of power, understandings of masculinity, minimising the significance of abuse and so on apply both in the case of behaviours such sexual violence and torture by security personnel.

³⁹ This chapter is drawn from Professor Moira Carmody's expert report prepared for the project, Moira Carmody, *What types of strategies and interventions are available to effect cultural, situational, organisational and psychological change?*, Expert Report Prepared for the Enhancing Human Rights Project (2012).

⁴⁰ See *Human Rights Training in the Security Sector: A Critical Overview and Analysis of the Field* (Sydney, Enhancing Human Rights Project, 2014).

⁴¹ Danielle Celermajer and Kiran Grewal, "Preventing Human Rights Violations 'From the Inside': Enhancing the Role of Human Rights Education in Security Sector Reform," *Journal of Human Rights Practice* 5, no. 2 (2013): 1 – 24.

Thus while it is unlikely for example that some one actually 'orders' a man to behave abusively towards women, as we have argued in Chapter One of *Issues Paper 2: Exploring the Root Causes of the Torture* this is also often the case for the use of torture. As such, the dynamics of compliance and contextual norms around the value of members of the violated group (in this case women) may in many ways resemble those that operate in contexts where torture routinely occurs. A judicious application of the lessons learned from transforming the norms that underpin such 'private' pathological behaviours can thus significantly expand our toolkit for preventing the use of torture in security settings.

What Makes an Intervention or Program Effective?

Over the last three decades, there have been a large number of programs designed to alter norms (beliefs and attitudes) and behaviours in key areas that are considered harmful or unacceptable. These include sexual abuse and sexual violence, violence against women and children, youth violence, juvenile delinquency, drug and alcohol abuse and harmful or unsafe sexual practices. A number of researchers have conducted 'meta-evaluations', that is, studies of evaluations of a large number of individual programs that generate common findings about what makes a program more likely to be effective. In 2003, Nation and his co-researchers conducted a meta-evaluation of prevention literature across four areas of social concern (substance abuse, risky sexual behaviour, school failure, and juvenile delinquency and violence) to ascertain factors associated with effective prevention programs.⁴² They found the following factors were consistently associated with effective prevention programs:

- The program was based on a clear and well articulated theory;
- Comprehensiveness;
- Varied teaching methods were applied;
- Sufficient dosage (i.e. that the programs were sufficiently long and detailed);
- Appropriately timed;
- Provided opportunities for positive relationships;
- Socio-culturally relevant and specifically built around the target audience;
- Included outcome evaluation;
- Involved well-trained staff.

A few years later a similar wide-ranging review of successful, multi-level primary prevention approaches in other fields was carried out.⁴³ The key elements for effective primary prevention that they identified confirm the earlier findings. These key elements for a successful prevention program were:

- Sound theoretical rationales or frameworks;
- Comprehensiveness;
- Community engagement;
- Contextualised programming;
- Focus on structural contributors to the problem;
- An emphasis on positive development.

Importantly, the factors identified here are not specific to the subject area, but appear to apply no matter what type of problematic norm or practice we are trying to transform. In 2008, a detailed analysis of international best practice literature on effective prevention education formed the basis of six recommended national standards specifically aimed at sexual assault prevention education but relevant for our purposes.⁴⁴ These standards are:

- Using coherent conceptual approaches to program design;
- Demonstrating the use of a theory of change;
- Undertaking inclusive, relevant and culturally sensitive practice;
- Undertaking comprehensive program development and delivery;
- Using effective evaluation strategies;
- Supporting thorough training and professional development of educators.

⁴² Nation et al., "What works in prevention".

⁴³ Erin A. Casey and Taryn P. Lindhorst, "Toward a multi-level, ecological approach to the primary prevention of sexual assault: Prevention in peer and community contexts," *Trauma, Violence and Abuse* 10, no. 2 (2009): 91–114.

⁴⁴ Moira Carmody et al., *Framing best practice: National standards for the primary prevention of sexual assault through education* (Sydney: University of Western Sydney Australia, 2009).

Looking at these common components of effective prevention strategies, we can discern some that are clearly relevant to work on the prevention of torture. First, any prevention project must be based on a sound theory of change. Such a theory should robustly explain what it is that causes and sustains the problem as well as how the intervention is supposed to work to effect change. Second, and relatedly, the theory and the intervention need to be grounded in a contextualised understanding of the site where and the group that the intervention is targeting. Formative empirical research, which includes both some type of assessment of the community's readiness and of how the problem operates and occurs within the particular context are critical to the success of a prevention intervention. We discuss this in detail below. Third, the program has to be tailored to the cultural, social and other contextual dimensions of the target audience. This means more than simply adding local examples or translating into local languages. It requires developing a program that is responsive to the realities, understandings, prior experiences, aspirations, resistances, intra-group conflicts and material circumstances of the group concerned. Fourth, prevention programs must be comprehensive, in the sense that they both address a range of factors relevant to the problem and are sufficiently sustained. Ideally, and going back to our discussion in Chapter Two of *Issues Paper 2: Exploring the Root Causes of the Torture*, programs would address various dimensions of the system that sustain them (individual, community, legal, political). Fifth, and as discussed further below, it is important that prevention work includes not only negative admonition but also positive alternatives and opportunities for developing positive alternatives. Finally, building an evaluation strategy into the program is likely to increase its effectiveness and will certainly assist in making adjustments to improve effectiveness in the future.

A final factor, not found in these evaluations, but coming out of assessments of social marketing strategies, is that prevention programs must have political support.⁴⁵ Clearly, when we are working with state actors such as security personnel, political support will be absolutely critical. This will be the case even if the use of torture is not the direct result of political interventions or orders.

Understanding the Target Audience and Gauging its Readiness for Change

As soon as we move from theories of change or abstract theories about human rights to the practice of bringing about a particular change, we are always engaging with a particular group at a particular point in its own history. That means that the target audience of the change process will already have a set of attitudes or orientations towards the proposed change, even if these are implicit. They may, for example, have been subject to extensive international criticism for human rights abuses and so have a very negative and defensive attitude to human rights programs and actors identified with human rights. They may have already been put through various human rights programs by a range of international actors and so have developed a great deal of cynicism towards human rights. Alternatively, they may already be well on the way of bringing about improvements to their organisation's structures and processes in a way designed to ensure human rights protection and so be looking towards this intervention for a specific type of support.

No matter how well a program is designed, or how brilliant its contents are, if the participants cannot see its relevance to them, or if they feel that it does not speak to how they understand the world, it will fall on deaf ears. This may seem obvious, but our survey of human rights training and education programs indicates that very little if any attention is paid to the specific qualities of the target audience before a program is introduced.

This need to conduct research on the characteristics of the problem and the target group, sometimes known as formative or elicitation research, was one of the components noted in all of the meta-evaluations discussed in the previous section and was similarly found to be critical to the effectiveness of social marketing campaigns, that is, any prevention strategy that seeks to alter public attitudes and values around a particular form of behaviour:

"Formative research is not only necessary to avoid unintended negative consequences, but also to map out the complex web of attitudes, beliefs, knowledge and skills relevant to the behavioural objectives of any particular campaign. If a campaign budget does not include a sufficient allocation for formative research, then given the dangers that an under-researched campaign presents in terms of wasting considerable money that could be allocated to on-the-ground activities, and of strengthening undesirable attitudes, we would suggest that such a campaign should not run at all."⁴⁶

⁴⁵ Robert J. Donovan and Rodney Vlasis, *VicHealth Review of Communication Components of Social Marketing/Public Education Campaigns Focusing on Violence against Women* (Melbourne: Victorian Health Promotion Foundation, 2005).

⁴⁶ Donovan and Vlasis, *VicHealth Review*, 197-198.

Indeed, research in public health indicates that before we even begin to think about the *substance* of an intervention, we need to have an eye to the *readiness* of its target audience to receive prevention messages.⁴⁷ A failure to recognise that communities are at different stages in terms of knowledge, attitudes and skills will result in a poor match between community needs and prevention initiatives and will reduce the likelihood of achieving change.⁴⁸ Correlatively, if we accurately understand the characteristics of the target audience we can ‘pitch’ the program at the right level. The type of transformative programs that would be appropriate for a community that does not think that certain behaviours are a problem at all will be quite different to the type of work we might do with a community that has been working on that issue for ten years.

The Community Readiness Model (CRM), developed by the Tri-Ethnic Center for Prevention Research at Colorado State University provides a tool for assessing a community’s culture and readiness for change and provides resources to develop and implement change strategies appropriate to the assessed stage of readiness.⁴⁹ Community readiness is defined as the degree to which a community is prepared to take action on an issue. It is not, however a uniform quality of a community but is issue-specific and may vary across different segments of a community. Readiness measurable across multiple dimensions can be successfully increased.⁵⁰

The CRM provides a tool for assessing readiness, which comprises a 36-question structured interview schedule that should be used with a small sample of informants (the authors recommend between 4 and 6). Questions fall within categories assessing the different dimensions: community efforts to address the issue; community knowledge about those efforts; leadership; community climate; knowledge about the issue; and resources for prevention efforts. Examples of questions are: ‘Using a scale of 1-10, how much of a concern is this issue in your community?’; ‘What are the primary obstacles to efforts addressing this issue in your community?’ Two raters then independently score the answers across the six dimensions, bring their own scores together and use them to determine where the community sits on the readiness scale across the different dimensions or different issues. Table 1 sets out the different stages.⁵¹

Table 1: Stages of Community Readiness

Stage	Description of community readiness
No awareness	The issue is not generally recognised by the community or leaders as a problem (or it may truly not be an issue)
Denial/resistance	At least some community members recognise that it is a concern, but there is little recognition that it might be occurring locally. “It’s not our problem.” “It’s just those people who do that.” “We can’t do anything about it.”
Vague awareness	Most community members feel that there is a local concern, but there is no immediate motivation to do anything about it
Preplanning	There is clear recognition that something must be done, and there may even be a group addressing it. However, efforts are not focused or detailed.
Preparation	Active leaders begin planning in earnest. Community offers modest support of efforts.
Initiation	Enough information is available to justify efforts. Activities are underway.
Stabilisation	Administrators or community decision makers support activities. Staff are trained and experienced.
Confirmation/ expansion	Efforts are in place. Community members feel comfortable using services, and they support expansions. Local data are regularly obtained.
High level of community ownership	Detailed and sophisticated knowledge exists about prevalence, causes, and consequences. Effective evaluation guides new directions. The model is applied to other issues.

⁴⁷ Community can be defined as population or geographically based or on affiliation around certain values, beliefs or interests. Police and military organisations in Nepal and Sri Lanka represent specific forms of community and within the larger grouping there may be specific communities for example based on attachment based on rank, faith or politics.

⁴⁸ A similar logic underpins the employment of training needs assessments in the development of education and training programs. See Office and the High Commissioner for Human Rights and Equitas, *Evaluating human Rights Training Activities; A Handbook for Human Rights Educators* (Montreal: UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 2011)

⁴⁹ Ruth W. Edwards et al., “Community readiness: Research to practice,” *Journal of Community Psychology* 28, no. 3 (2000): 291- 307; Barbara A. Plested, Ruth W. Edwards, and Pamela Jumper-Thurman, *Community readiness: A handbook for successful change* (Fort Collins, CO: Tri-Ethnic Center for Prevention Research, 2006).

⁵⁰ Plested, Edwards and Jumper-Thurman, “Community Readiness”

⁵¹ In her assessment of the tool, Carmody notes that in practice it presents some problems, mainly because informants’ answers do not fit neatly into the recommended coding categories and because it is difficult for the raters to reach consensus. Carmody, M. 2012. *What types of strategies and interventions are available to effect cultural, situational, organisational and psychological change?* Expert Commissioned Report for the EHRP.

The Community Readiness Model Handbook provides a number of strategies to assist communities to progress in their development towards greater understanding of a particular issue requiring prevention.⁵² For example, a strategy recommended if the community is at Stage 1 (no awareness) would be to make one-on-one visits with community leaders/members. If the community is at Stage 4 (pre-planning), a strategy might be to conduct local focus groups to discuss issues and develop strategies.

The CRM was originally developed for alcohol and drug abuse prevention programs, but has been adapted for use in various prevention programs around health, violent behaviour and environmental protection. While it has not, to our knowledge, been used in human rights-based prevention programs, it could certainly assist in tailoring prevention interventions to ensure that they are appropriately pitched or in developing strategies to assist target audiences in increasing their readiness for more intensive prevention programs.

What Do We Know About Shifting Individuals Beliefs and Behaviours? The Social Learning Model

Assessing community readiness for change is crucial to effective prevention work, as is understanding how we can change the structures and processes of organisations in order to alter the systemic factors that shape individual behaviours (as discussed in Chapter Three of *Issues Paper 2: Exploring the Root Causes of Torture* and Chapter One above). Nevertheless, any change process must engage individuals and as such, we also need to be mindful of the ways individuals change and what types of processes facilitate individual normative (attitudinal) and behavioural change.

There are obviously too many theories or models of individual change to discuss here, so we limit ourselves to the Social Learning Model derived from Bandura's work (discussed in Chapter One of *Issues Paper 2: Exploring the Root Causes of Torture*). We focus on this model because, consistent with our systemic or ecological theory approach (discussed in Chapter Two of *Issues Paper 2*), it focuses on the interplay of personal factors, the social environment and behaviour. The Social Learning Model inquires into the mental processes that a person adopts to make sense of his or her social environment, and how this leads to his or her behaving in particular ways.⁵³ These mental processes are influenced by how individuals process or interpret the images and words around them, translating them into their own attitudes and behaviour.

The behaviours that they then adopt are then either reinforced by the positive responses others have to them, or by positive consequences of their behaviours. Alternatively, negative responses and consequences may lead them to try out other behaviours. Importantly here, the effect of those consequences or responses cannot be objectively assessed but depends on how the individual in question perceives those responses and consequences. A good example of this would be the kudos that young people may associate with getting into trouble with the law or other authority figures.

An individual's behaviours are also reinforced or reshaped when he or she observes how others are behaving and the consequences of or responses to their behaviours. Therefore a person would be more likely to engage in positive behaviour change when he or she sees positive behaviours modeled and practiced, is able to increase his or her own capability and to implement new skills, is able to gain positive attitudes about implementing new skills (known as self-efficacy) and experiences support from his or her social environment in order to use their new skills.

Some important research about the role that our beliefs and our assessments about other people's beliefs play in changing behaviour may be particularly useful in working out how best to influence personnel in the police and military. The 'Information, Motivation, Behaviour (IMB) model' for example draws on empirical findings indicating that providing information is necessary but not sufficient to achieve behavioural change.⁵⁴ Further, and as discussed in the previous section, where information is useful, it is based on prior research about existing knowledge gaps in the target population. More specifically it suggests that to be effective, information should be provided in a form that is easily translated into behaviours and tied to actions that can be readily understood and not induce fear of change. This is a critically important finding for those interested in developing human rights education and training programs for security forces. It indicates that presenting abstract principles and information about laws or norms is likely to have little effect on participants' behaviour.

⁵² Plested, Edwards and Jumper-Thurman, "Community Readiness".

⁵³ Brad Perry, "Working from a deliberate basis: theory and primary sexual violence/ interpersonal violence prevention," *Moving Upstream: Virginia's Newsletter for the primary prevention of Sexual Violence* 5, no. 1 (2009).

⁵⁴ Jeffrey D. Fisher and William A. Fisher, "Changing AIDS risk behavior," *Psychological Bulletin* 111, no. 3 (1992): 455-474.

By contrast, material that directly engages the tasks participants will need to undertake and the real challenges they face and assists them in working out how to do so in new ways, as well as developing the required skills, is more likely to alter their future choices and behaviours.

This models also draws on theories of how motivation works that can usefully inform any strategy aiming at bringing about attitudinal or behavioural change. Specifically, it posits that various factors affect motivation, including the subject's attitude to the practice we are seeking to prevent, the existing norms concerning the practice in question, the perceived vulnerability of those norms, and the perceived costs and benefits of stopping the practice. Underpinning this understanding is the Fishbein-Ajzen theory on motivation, which asserts that motivation is underpinned by several factors.⁵⁵ First is the subject's attitude to performing the act in question, which in turn is influenced by his or her beliefs about the consequences of performing the action, and his or her evaluation of those consequences. Second, motivation is underpinned by subjective norms or a person's evaluation of what others whom he or she considers significant believe should be done. In other words, an individual's own motivation to adopt or change a certain behaviour is in part determined by what he or she believes such 'referents' or figures of influence believe and value as well as by how powerful are the forces of compliance binding him or her to these others' beliefs and values.

Alongside the role that personal attitudes and social norms play in motivation, a person's emotional responses to the behaviours being encouraged or discouraged is also a determining factor. In other words, motivation cannot simply be read through an objective evaluation of the value of costs and benefits but must be understood subjectively. What do I think is going to happen if I behave in a certain way? How do I evaluate those outcomes? What do the people whose views matter to me think about what I am doing? And finally, how do different patterns of action make me *feel*?

These questions are illustrated in Figure 1 below.



Figure 1: Factors contributing to motivation

Once again, this research emphasises the importance of conducting empirical research on the target audience so that we have a rich understanding of the people whose behaviour we wish to influence, of what they think is important, what they think and feel about different ways of behaving and who influences them.

The Role of Bystanders and the Possibilities of Horizontal Influence and Intervention

This research on motivation and social learning, together with social norm theories highlight the ways that the majority culture or the more immediate normative environment shape the beliefs and attitudes held by an individual.⁵⁶ Indeed, the research on compliance and conformity discussed in Chapter One of *Issues Paper 2: Exploring the Root Causes of Torture* similarly demonstrated how the dynamics of compliance and conformity can result in individuals committing human rights violations.

⁵⁵ Martin F. Fishbein and Icek Ajzen, *Belief, Attitude, Intention, and Behavior: An Introduction to Theory and Research* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1975).

⁵⁶ Sue Dyson and Michael Flood, *Building Cultures of Respect and Non-Violence*, Victoria (Melbourne: Australian Football League and VicHealth, 2008).

These very same dynamics and processes can, however, be exploited to reshape behaviour in more positive ways. Drawing on such theories, a range of interventions that seek to alter individuals' behaviours by influencing the people around them has been developed.

The first set of approaches, 'bystander interventions' seek to mobilise the community members, peers or co-workers who might be witnesses to violations to positively intervene to prevent or condemn them.⁵⁷ Bystander intervention may take the form of directly trying to stop someone from carrying out the action in question, for example, preventing someone from acting violently or stopping them when they are doing so. Alternatively, it may involve challenging the attitudes and values that sustain the problematic behaviours, for example by refusing to join in racist or sexist banter or challenging a friend or peer when they are recounting 'war stories' of violence, sexual exploitation or drinking. Research indicates that pro-social bystander interventions have been effective in promoting non-violent forms of masculinity and that they have been successful in engaging members of communities that previously felt issues such as violence against women were private matters.⁵⁸

At the same time, given what we know about peer pressure and the extreme negative consequences that can follow for those who refuse to conform with violent behaviours that are normative within a sub-culture, this strategy needs to be approached with significant caution. As the Israeli study discussed above demonstrated, individuals who speak out against human rights violations may experience scape-goating or worse. In certain circumstances, for example in police and military contexts where cultures of compliance are particularly tight and forceful, bystander interventions are unlikely to be effective (and may be unsafe) unless they produce a sufficient counter-weight to the existing dynamics of compliance.

In this regard, teaching people how to use bystander skills safely is of crucial importance to ensure their own personal safety. Moreover, bystander strategies will only ultimately succeed if they are complemented by more formal sanctions such as organisational policies condemning torture and effective punishment of those who are found to be using it. In this sense, the informal normative condemnation that a bystander intervention effects and its potential influence in individuals' own norms and behaviours is reinforced by and localises the broader and more formal condemnation that may, in its remoteness and formality, have little impact on individuals' beliefs about what is right or their actual behaviours. Working directly at this more local context of influence is consistent with the social psychological research discussed in Chapter One of *Issues Paper 2: Exploring the Root Causes of Torture*, which indicated that when individuals are assessing the right thing to do in a particular situation, they do not look not to some generalised norm, but to the behaviour of those identified as peers and/or authority figures.

Leaders, Peers and Influence

The second type of approach that seeks to change individuals' behaviours by influencing those around them is the 'Social Influence Model'. This approach works by shifting the "normative attitudes and opinions of the peer and reference groups that people use to guide their decisions and behaviours".⁵⁹ To do this, the first step is to identify who are the relevant referents (i.e. peers or figures of influence) and to work with them both on their attitudes and behaviours and on how they communicate with those they might influence. This strategy then has a multiplication effect insofar as others look to them to shape their own practices. An interesting application of the use of the social influence model is the 'community popular opinion leader' approach to HIV prevention. In one project, influential community figures at the local level were identified using ethnographic methods and targeted for intensive education with a view to influencing the views of others.⁶⁰ The key here was finding out who these figures of influence were and then concentrating on working with *them* as seeds for broader change.

In highly hierarchical organisations like the security forces, those in positions of leadership or authority will be a critical source of norms and models for appropriate behaviour. As such, they may well be the best targets in this type of approach. To be most effective in bringing about deep and broad normative influence, however, it is not sufficient for a leader to simply possess and exercise formal authority. Where leaders are able to obtain compliance only on the basis of their access to the means of force and their official authority, it is unlikely that their subordinates will look to them as role models or referents for their own values and behaviours. Influence requires that the leader be respected as a person to be emulated.

⁵⁷ Anastasia Powell, *Review of bystander approaches in support of preventing violence against women: preventing violence against women by increasing participation in respectful relationships* (Melbourne: Victorian Health Promotion Foundation, 2011)

⁵⁸ Victoria L. Banyard, Mary M. Moynihan and Elizabeth G. Plante, "Sexual violence prevention through bystander education: An experimental evaluation," *Journal of Community Psychology* 35, no. 4 (2007): 463. ; Moira Carmody, *Sex and ethics: Young people and ethical sex* (Melbourne: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009)

⁵⁹ Donovan and Vlasis, *VicHealth Review*, 77.

⁶⁰ NIMH Collaborative HIV/STD Prevention Trial Group, "Methodological overview of a five-country community-level HIV/sexually transmitted disease prevention trial," *AIDS* 21 (2007): S3-S18.

Such models of leadership are certainly well known in security organisations, where the most admired leaders are often those who demonstrate their preparedness to take the same risks and undertake the same difficult duties as their subordinates and who demonstrate, through their behaviour, the virtues they espouse.

Nevertheless, the type of influence on values, attitudes and behaviours that can be effected by referents may require developing new forms of leadership, or dimensions of leadership that enhance relatedness and communication. It is beyond the scope of this report to look in any detail at the rich body of research on developing leadership, but it is worth taking note of the growing body of research that addresses relational aspects of leadership.⁶¹ This research considers how, in contemporary social conditions, effective leadership requires the ability to establish the connectedness and collaboration required to build ethical and respectful relationships. Indeed, in her research on the transformation of the Public Order Police (POP) unit of the South African Police Service in Durban, Monique Marks drew strikingly similar conclusions about the importance of relational forms of leadership. Specifically, she found that while close supervision, or a style of leadership that involves policing the behaviour of subordinates can bring about short-term behavioural change, a deeper and sustained transformation requires the introduction of new styles of leadership and indeed the creation of different workplace cultures. Her findings merit quoting at some length:

“Real change within police organisations will only take place if the attitudes of both management and rank-and-file officers are altered, and this involves a constant review of the successes of changed police conduct and responses. The initial and sustained transformation of police behaviour depends heavily on careful and well-informed front-line supervision at all times. However, close supervision should not simply be imposed on rank-and-file members. In order for police to engage with new value systems and belief systems, an environment needs to be created where all police members are able to actively participate in change processes. This requires a fundamental shift away from traditional and typical management styles and structures in police organisations towards more participatory forms of management (Reiner, 1992; Bayley, 1994).

Such changes in management styles in the police would hopefully lead to greater understanding of change processes (Washo, 1984) and make change more acceptable. This in turn would motivate police members to actively involve themselves in projects aimed at change. High morale, it is argued, promotes pride, efficiency, and harmony, and will consequently enhance the acceptability of the profession and the quality of service rendered (van Heerden, 1982).

Excluding rank and file members from information and decision making with regard to change processes will leave them feeling disillusioned, manipulated, frustrated, and lacking in motivation. Wilms (1996) argues that real commitment to a changed culture can only come about if workplace practices and relations are transformed. A move toward participatory, person-centred management requires a completely revised way of organising the work process and a major change in the entire occupational culture - a change in values, assumptions, and ways of coping.

The transformation of police organisations is a complicated task. It involves changing the very nature of how work is organised so that there is space both for increased participation and ownership on the part of rank-and-file members, and at the same time, a commitment to vigilant supervision in the field. Both of these are needed for significant change in behaviour and in value systems.”⁶²

In the final chapter of this *Issues Paper* we turn to the specific organisations with which we were working and how we built relationships with them that would support organisational and cultural change.

⁶¹ Sonia Ospina and Erica Foldy, “Building bridges from the margins: The work of leadership in social change organizations,” *The Leadership Quarterly* 21 (2010): 292–307.

⁶² Marks, *Transforming Robocops*, 159-160. Quotes in original reference.

CHAPTER THREE: CREATING A COALITION FOR TRANSFORMATION: BUILDING RELATIONS BETWEEN HUMAN RIGHTS ACTORS AND SECURITY FORCES

“The grain of the organization must be made to work with reform rather than against it.”⁶³

Two of the key principles that emerged from the review of the organisational change literature in Chapter One of this *Issues Paper* were that organisational change has to be driven from the inside of the organisation and that both leaders and the rank and file need to be enrolled in change.

Outsiders can offer expertise, support and resources and they can work to effect change in other realms of the system (for example with communities or allied organisations such as the judiciary) in ways that will support organisational change. But they will not be able to make any positive contribution to organisational reform itself unless this is something that is embraced by those within the organisation. In this chapter, we discuss how the *Enhancing Human Rights Protections in the Security Sector in the Asia Pacific Project* sought to go ‘with the grain’ of the organisations with whom we were working.

Human Rights and the Security Sector: Inevitable Opposition or Productive Tension?

People who work in the field of human rights have a clear interest in promoting and protecting human rights. This is not only because they have personally embraced human rights as their normative stance, but also because they have professionally committed to this objective and indeed their professional success depends on their achieving outcomes associated with human rights protection and promotion.

This type of direct alignment with human rights is not, however, natural or self-evident in the case of security forces. On the normative side, police or military organisations or individuals within the police or military may or may not embrace human rights (both *de jure* and *de facto*), any more than everyone in the general public will do so. Moreover, although today many security organisations formally and officially embrace human rights, security organisations have not, traditionally defined their role as promoting and protecting human rights. Similarly, from an instrumental perspective, the core objectives of police and military include ensuring national security, law enforcement and preventing criminal activity. Indeed, members of the police and military throughout the world may feel that protecting human rights gets in the way of their doing their jobs. At worst, this will be expressed as a belief that human rights (and the people who promote them) are on the side of criminals or terrorists. At best, they may say that those who preach human rights to them fail to appreciate that the work of keeping law and order or national security cannot afford the niceties of human rights.

Our survey of human rights educational and training programs for security forces indicated that when human rights agencies and actors seek to convince (rather than to force) members of the security forces to ascribe to human rights principles in their work, they draw on both normative and instrumental reasoning. Thus for example, training manuals speak about the inherent dignity of all persons and the principles of equality and universality at the same time as they make arguments about how protecting human rights assists police or military in achieving their core objectives. Many, for example, point out that by protecting human rights makes the communities in which they work sympathetic allies rather than enemies and that this type of cooperative environment is conducive to achieving law enforcement and security objectives.

Both the human rights actors who write those manuals and the members of security organisations who accept or deliver them have an obvious investment in affirming this complementarity. If we are honest, however, we will admit that the fact that such arguments need to be made in human rights manuals betrays the default belief within many security organisations and probably amongst many human rights actors, that human rights and the core objectives of security organisations are not natural allies. The tension is an uncomfortable one, but it is there, even if we choose to pretend otherwise. As a starting point, human rights actors need to appreciate that the people working in security organisations have a set of objectives to which they are already committed and which they are unlikely to give up simply because they do not easily conform with human rights.

The question of the impetus or the starting point of a project involving human rights and security forces is thus critical. It is worth asking oneself what it is that brings such a project into existence? Is the project initiated by people within the security organisation who wish to bring about changes and are looking for external allies? Is the project taking place against the background of a history of ‘naming and shaming’, where international organisations, other states and/or NGOs have accused security organisations of human rights violations?

⁶³ David H. Bayley, *Democratizing the Police Abroad: What To Do and How To Do It* (Washington: National Institute of Justice, 2001), 20.

From the point of the organisational change theories discussed earlier, the ideal starting point would be security organisations themselves initiating the project. But it is unlikely that police and military, as traditionally closed organisations, will reach out to human rights organisations. And in the case of any of the other alternatives, the starting point will already render the project be somewhat fraught, because members of the security organisation will, at least to some extent, experience the project as an imposition – something that others believe that they ought to be doing and are compelling them to do.

Like many human rights projects, *Enhancing Human Rights Protections in the Security Sector in the Asia Pacific* was developed out of the impetus of a group of people and institutions falling into the ‘human rights’ camp – both internationally and in the countries concerned. It was this group of organisations that developed the idea and the overall design of the project and then we approached the police and military organisations with whom we hoped to work to ask them to come on board and work with us. As we entered more deeply into the project and came to a better understanding of how we wanted to work, it became evident that effectively supporting organisational change entailed the project partners developing a real understanding of the interests and motivations of the people in the security organisations with whom we were working.

And in truth, it is very difficult for people who wear the human rights label to find out what the real interests and motivations of people in security forces are. Our histories and experience of each other are, after all, histories of distrust and sometimes conflict. Those in the human rights camp have often already decided that those in security forces are hostile to human rights and to them and their colleagues, and have dedicated tremendous energy to ensuring that members of the security forces are punished for committing human rights violations. Correlatively, people in security forces may be suspicious of human rights people, both anticipating their accusations and condemning their failure to appreciate the harsh realities in which they must trade.

In the face of this situation, one can well understand why human rights actors have adopted the traditional approaches discussed in *Issues Paper 1*. Assuming that security organisations are hostile to human rights, they imagine that the only way to bring about change is through threats of punishment or shaming. The alternative, seeking to bring about change from the inside entails reimagining who the personnel in security forces are and then trying to build an alliance. Whether such an alliance can be built will depend on the skill, commitment and imagination of all the concerned parties. It will depend on whether they can build sufficient trust and whether they can begin to understand the very different perspectives and experiences that the different parties bring. Only this foundation will make it possible for them to cooperate to challenge existing structures, processes and cultures in a manner that can be assimilated by the organisations concerned.

Identifying Interests

Coming down from these somewhat lofty reflections, let us now turn to how this project sought to negotiate the tensions and differences so as to establish a creative space for change. In this regard, one of the first steps we needed to take was to develop a sound understanding of what the interests, aspirations and values of security personnel actually were. Understanding what people care about, what their values are and what motivates them then provides a basis for identifying how human rights fits into their world.

In our interviews with security personnel, we asked what was important to them professionally and personally as well as what they hoped to achieve in their careers. We also asked them what they thought an ideal member of their organisation was like, and what they thought were the core values and mission of their organisation? We asked them what they thought about human rights? Whether they thought they mattered and why?

The data yielded through this research, together with broader research on the organisations, furnished us with a richer understanding of what was, in fact, valued by security personnel and how they held human rights in relation to their other interests and values. In some cases, what we found out provided fairly straightforward ideas about organisational change strategies that could enhance human rights protection. For example, being selected for UN missions represents a prized opportunity (professionally, personally and financially) and as such, strengthening the links between an officer’s human rights record and their selection for UN missions would provide one mechanism for aligning human rights with existing interests and incentives. Similarly, most personally have an interest in promotions and receiving honours, so building criteria around human rights compliance into promotions other rewards offers a way of aligning incentives.

Other personnel expressed a strong commitment to making a difference to their communities and to being respected by members of the public as well as a dislike of being held in contempt or ill regard as people who would violate human rights. In such cases, there is already a normative alliance and the way forward may involve enhancing the ability of those personnel to act in accordance with their commitments.

This might take the form of building alliances with others similarly committed, or encouraging the development of incentives within the organisation to reward such commitments (both symbolically and materially), or affirming their identity as potential leaders who can make a difference by behaving in line with their values and beliefs. Indeed, in one of our workshops with members of the security organisations, a senior member of one of the organisations admonished the personnel present for assuming that change was up to others and called upon them to be change-makers themselves rather than seeing themselves as pawns in a system that they could not change. Such statements do not indicate a failure to appreciate that individuals always operate within existing cultures, processes and structures (as discussed in *Issues Paper 1*). Rather the senior officer was appealing to the existing commitments of security personnel and urging them to act on those commitments.

One challenge that does merit comment concerns the question of what happens when there does seem to be a genuine conflict between human rights principles and the expressed interests or values of security personnel. How, for example, should the partners in a human rights project proceed where some of them are expressing the view that they do not agree with certain human rights principles or laws?

In some cases, the problem is only cosmetic, insofar as the 'human rights' that are the cause of the objection are not human rights as generally understood. In our research for example we found cases of security personnel objecting to human rights because they thought that human rights means that everyone can do whatever they want, or that human rights precludes members of the military killing people in war. Where this is the case, a conversation clarifying what human rights actually allow and require will deal with the conflict.

In other cases, the disagreements are not merely definitional, but concern actual belief. For example, as discussed in the Introduction these Issues Papers, there is likely to be broad agreement that torture is impermissible, but disagreement about the type of acts that are or are not improper. More broadly, there may be disagreement about basic principles such as the absolute equality of all persons. For example, in contexts with histories of systematic racial discrimination or where women have been excluded from public life and positions of power, or where caste, ethnicity or religious differences have been both marked and hierarchical, or where there are enormous and entrenched economic inequalities, the notion that all people should be treated equally, irrespective gender, race, ethnicity, caste, religion or class is unlikely to attract universal agreement. Importantly, such disagreements are hardly unique to members of the security sector or to particular countries; systematic discrimination on the basis of gender, race, religion, ethnicity, caste or class is a feature of virtually every society.

This project has not identified and does not propose a simple answer to how one proceeds in the face of such differences. Nevertheless, we see it as an issue that merits further thought. One of the criticisms that we have of many of the human rights trainings designed for and delivered to security forces (discussed in our Report *International Review: Current Approaches to Human Rights Training in the Law Enforcement and Security Sectors*) is precisely that they suggest discussions about such difficult issues, but provide no guidance to facilitators about what to do if participants express views that conflict with human rights laws and principles.

We can say that people wearing human rights hats, particularly international actors, telling security personnel that they have the wrong values or attitudes is not going to produce anything other than further antagonism and undermine any possibility of transformative conversations. But neither is silence or complicity an adequate response. A useful starting point may rather be to provide the conversational space in which different actors can candidly and honestly unpack how they have come to form their views. It may also be useful for them to identify what within the idea of equality or dignity or respect they do agree with and to articulate the reasons for their disagreement with human rights. Such conversations will be most fruitful where views are challenged not by outsiders but by those who are seen as leaders or people worthy of respect or role models. That said, one of the fundamental propositions of this project is that people's attitudes and values are not free floating 'ideas' that then determine what we do and how we act. Rather, attitudes and values are to a significant extent formed by the type of experience that individuals have of how the world actually works. As such, it will largely be through creating structures, processes and broader cultures that create incentives for human rights and that normalise them that attitudes and values that support human rights will follow.

Building cooperative structures

At a much more mundane level, our project's architecture was designed to build collaboration and support ownership of the project by the security forces. This was achieved in a number of ways. First, in each country in which we worked, we established a reference group with members from the security forces as key members. The reference groups were involved at every stage of the project's development, including the research design, the research findings, the design of the intervention and the implementation of the intervention. This involvement took the form of briefing them on our research and proposals and seeking their views to ensure that their concerns were taken into consideration.

The two local partners in Sri Lanka and Nepal, the Centre for the Study of Human Rights and the Kathmandu School of Law, played particularly important roles in this regard. Their histories of cooperation with the security organisations with which we were working provided a basis for collaboration on this project. This history of cooperation did not mean that there were no differences in opinion; it rather provided a foundation to sustain the relationships and cooperation through such differences. Certainly in the two countries involved in this project, international actors are viewed with considerable suspicion or skepticism and it would have been impossible to develop cooperation without local organisations that were both able to build trust and sufficiently familiar with the complexities of the political and cultural context.

Regular, persistent and careful communication, ensuring that the security organisations had the experience that whatever happened in the project happened with their assent and, more than that, with their active agreement with the proposed course of action was critical to the project. After all, at any point, the organisations could have refused to allow their personnel to participate, or could have, in other ways undermined it. Even more importantly, the sustainability over the long term of the work that would take place within the life of this project depended on their having a sense of ownership and authorship.

The second way in which the project architecture built cooperation and ownership came at the point of the actual intervention, which is discussed in *Issues Paper 6*. As we explain there, our analysis suggested that because organisational change needs to be effected from the inside, our strategy needed to focus on providing support and resources to a select group within the organisations, who we called Human Rights Protection Facilitators (HRPFs). Thus, rather than the project team deciding on what type of organisational change projects should be undertaken and then trying to get people in the organisation to take them on, we sought to provide our HRPFs with the skills and capacities to work out what the risk factors were for torture occurring, or how their organisations could inhibit the use of torture. On the basis of the factors that they identified, they would then design projects to reduce the risks or strengthen the inhibiting factors. The critical point for this discussion is that the project design placed the responsibility for identifying risk or inhibiting factors and for working out how to bring about change with the personnel within the security organisations. This choice presented some challenges, particularly insofar as we were asking our HRPFs to learn a range of new research and project planning skills and take on a range of new responsibilities. Its critical advantage, however, was that it embedded the impetus in the organisations. This meant that the organisations would have a sense of ownership and so investment in success and that after the project was formally over, the key personnel responsible for bringing about change would remain committed.



