



## Issues Paper 8

### Measuring Change: Evaluating a Torture Prevention Project

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# **ISSUES PAPER 8: MEASURING CHANGE: EVALUATING A TORTURE PREVENTION PROJECT**

## **INTRODUCTION**

In this Issues Paper we turn to the evaluation of the Enhancing Human Rights Project (EHRP). Given that our evaluation process raised many questions about the nature and challenges of evaluation, we took the occasion of this Issues Paper to go beyond simply speaking about how we conducted our evaluation and what we found. Rather, we saw it as an opportunity to think through some of the broader issues that are raised for any project working on serious human rights violations, particularly where the violations in question are largely concealed and so inadequately documented and where the violations have been historically resistant to human rights interventions.

Chapter One looks at what we mean by evaluation and why evaluation is important and then discusses some of the distinctive challenges of evaluating human rights projects and identifying methodologies that are both robust and feasible. Chapter Two turns more specifically to the process that we adopted in evaluating the EHRP. It looks first at how we built evaluation plans into the original project planning, then at how we developed a more detailed and multi-dimensional evaluation strategy and finally discusses in details the principal pillars of evaluation for the EHRP: evaluation of the research; evaluations of the HRPFs' projects, and; overall evaluation of the EHRP. Chapter Three sets out some of the most important findings from each of the three distinct evaluation processes we underwent and discusses what they tell us about the intended and unintended outcomes, outputs and impact of our project. In the Conclusion we consider some of the lessons we learned about evaluating projects of this nature and some of the key lessons about working with security sector organisations as one possible approach to preventing torture.

## CHAPTER ONE: THE IMPORTANT CHALLENGES OF EVALUATION

### (i) *What is evaluation?*

The meaning of evaluation may seem obvious. However, before discussing the challenges of evaluation and how this informed the ways we evaluated the EHRP, a brief introduction on evaluation and what it has come to mean for human rights work may be useful. At the most general level, evaluation is concerned with looking back over what a project has done and working out what changes it has brought about. The motivations for conducting evaluations are most commonly threefold; first for the people undertaking a project to determine what results they can identify and whether these results indicate that the original proposed objectives of the project have been achieved; second to report back to the donor or funding agency that their funding was well-spent; and third to identify areas of improvement for future actors working on similar areas to consider.

In the lifecycle of a human rights or prevention project, evaluation first appears in the project design and proposal stage. Commonly referred to as 'M&E', a framework setting out how a project team will monitor and then evaluate the success of their project is now very much an integral part of any project design and proposal. The M&E framework is a project management tool that, once the project is financed and under way, offers a reference point for project staff to assess how efficiently their project is running (monitoring) and how effective their project has been at reaching the objectives it set out to achieve (evaluation). This coupling of two linked but distinct processes has had the effect of conflating them as one single function. While intimately linked, we believe that it is important to make a clear distinction between *monitoring* and *evaluation*.

Monitoring is concerned with examining the implementation of a project by checking the project's activities, processes, outputs and ensuring that the project is progressing adequately and that any challenges or impediments are not being ignored. Monitoring occurs throughout the life of a project and tends to focus on the operational aspects of project implementation. Evaluation, on the other hand, is often thought of as occurring after a project has been completed. It is more specifically concerned with the results that a project achieved, which can only be fully ascertained after the project's completion. In practice the two can and should not be segregated, as ongoing project monitoring will provide the information required to understand the dynamics of a project's development towards success or achievement of results that become evident in the final evaluation. For example, if a project does not achieve what it set out to do, an effective monitoring process would have tracked the reasons for this impediment and, ideally, indicate a need to address them early enough to change course.

Once at the stage of evaluation, determining the results of a project usually requires looking at three distinct types of change or transformation: *outputs*, *outcomes* and *impacts*. Again, the lines between these three are not absolute, but one can distinguish them as follows. *Outputs* are the most concrete and thus easy to measure products of a project (meetings held, reports written and distributed, training manuals developed and so on). *Outcomes* are what those outputs produce or cause (a piece of legislation is passed, X number attend Y human rights trainings, a national human rights institution received Z number of reports on police torture). *Impacts* then come at the very end of the causal sequence as the actual effect on people's lives (changes in the attitudes and behaviour of police, reduction of the numbers of people experiencing torture and so on). Evaluations do and must measure outputs and outcomes, but ultimately it is impacts that matter the most. In addition, a good evaluation will not simply focus on the achievement of expected results, but will consider what has actually happened as a result of a project or intervention, irrespective whether those impacts were planned, intentional, negative or positive.

### (ii) *Why evaluate?*

Rigorous and thoughtful evaluation is a critically important part of any human rights prevention project. In comparison to other project management environments, where evaluation of 'hard systems' projects such as construction and manufacturing is relatively straight forward, Crawford and Bryce identify aid and development projects (and we would include human rights projects here), as being inherently political.<sup>1</sup> Working on social, economic and ecological interventions where there is a wide range of stakeholders and vested interests has therefore amplified the demand for higher levels of accountability to a number of different stakeholders for

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<sup>1</sup> Crawford Paul & Bryce Paul, "Project monitoring and evaluation: a method for enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of aid project implementation", *International Journal of Project Management* 21(5), 2003, 363-373

different reasons.<sup>2</sup> A well-planned and rigorous evaluation thus provides significant benefits for all of the stakeholders directly or indirectly involved in a project. Here we spell out some of the benefits for the human rights organisations that conducted the projects, for funders, for communities or 'beneficiaries' and for the human rights movement more broadly.

At the organisational level, a well-conducted evaluation indicates to a project team whether the project achieved the change they set out to produce and, at a more fine-grained level, what worked and what did not. The findings of an evaluation should, ideally, feed back into an organisation's future planning and project development so that each project builds on the lessons learned from the previous ones. Over the past two decades, the field of human rights and development has also seen an explosion of the number of organisations implementing donor-funded projects and programs; from local grass-roots organisations to national, regional and international NGOs, bilateral partnerships between aid-giving governments and developing countries and any combination of the above. One outcome of this expansion has been the creation of a competitive 'market' for organisations to win grants from the existing and shrinking pool of aid and donor funding available. In practical terms, human rights organisations can therefore use evaluations as evidence of their performance or track record in implementing projects, which may assist in winning future grants in this competitive space.



Figure 1: A Program Lifecycle

At a deeper level, recognising the role that evaluation can play in our longer-term development as organisations and as a field can shift the way that we think about evaluations. More specifically, it can help us to reframe how we respond to findings about the 'success' or 'failure' of different aspects of our projects. Certainly, we all want to produce results that make a difference in terms of the human rights of the people experiencing violations and the more immediate the difference the better. When it comes to truly difficult problems though - ones that have been resistant to traditional solutions - part of what we need to do is to develop our range of prevention tools. And, much like scientific research, this requires a learning process. Projects, or aspects of projects that, from one perspective, 'failed' can in some cases provide lessons and insights that are critical for future development.

From the point of view of human rights organisations, evaluation can also provide pointers to developmental work that they need to do internally, or indicate the partnerships that they need to build in order to strengthen their own capacities. Evaluations can, for example, indicate that the research component of a project was weak, indicating that it may be useful for the organisation to provide research training for its personnel, develop a research arm or partner with a more research focused organisation.

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<sup>2</sup> *ibid.*

Evaluation is also critical for funding agencies. Funders need to know whether the organisations that they supported carried out the activities that they had planned and expended the funds as they promised they would – information that monitoring provides. For agencies seeking to use their funds to pursue high-level goals over the longer term, for example the prevention of torture, it is important to know whether the approaches they chose to support produced the results they were hoping to see. Evaluation of particular projects will assist them in their own strategic planning and guide their future funding decisions.

A useful distinction here is between 'learning-based evaluation' and 'accountability-based evaluation'. Learning-based evaluation is principally concerned with generating lessons for future work (for organisations, communities and funders). Accountability-based evaluation is primarily concerned with ensuring that funds have been properly spent and that organisations have done what they promised to do. It is important that those designing impact evaluations recognise the tensions that might arise from these two different contexts or motivations.

Finally, evaluation is important for the communities and people who are supposed to be the beneficiaries of human rights projects. Because they are often dependent on the support of funding agencies, organisations are always aware that they need to account for their activities to the funder; but given the ultimate aim of our work, we are always also accountable to rights holders. At the most pragmatic level, this is because they often give of their time to participate in research or project activities and so can rightfully expect to see what the project produced. More importantly though, it is ultimately in their name that our work is justified and, as such, we are answerable to them. Providing evaluations of human rights projects to rights holders also assists them to sharpen their ideas about the future activities in which they wish to be involved and the type of projects they wish to support or advocate.

Beyond these discrete stakeholders, well-designed evaluations transform individual projects from discrete units to part of the ongoing and larger enterprise of the human rights field or community. When we evaluate our own projects and share our evaluations, we contribute to the overall progression in our fields. Others planning projects in the same or related fields can learn from and build on what we did so that they start where we left off, rather than from where we also started.

### **(iii) The challenges of human rights evaluation**

Despite all of these evident benefits and, more pointedly, despite the costs for all concerned of inadequate evaluation, the human rights field has not had a long, strong or consistent history of conducting rigorous evaluation. Impact evaluation in particular came relatively late to human rights. Indeed, it remains the case that many project evaluations do not even try to measure outcomes, let alone impacts, but get stuck on measuring outputs. In our research on human rights trainings conducted with security forces around the world we found that most evaluations go no further than measuring their outputs (i.e. the number of workshops held), or outcomes (i.e. how many security personnel attended workshops or how much trainees improved their knowledge of human rights law).

It is only in the last decade that human rights scholars and organisations and funding agencies have begun to seriously debate questions around how best to evaluate the impact of human rights interventions.<sup>3</sup> The good news is that with this increased attention has come an increased level of thinking about and experimentation into how to conduct evaluations in our field. An excellent study on evaluating human rights training conducted by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and Equitas provides a sophisticated analysis of evaluation that goes beyond outputs and even short-term impacts and sets out a range of useful tools.<sup>4</sup> Given that readers of this report may also be thinking about evaluating their own projects now or in the future, a brief overview of some of the key issues that have arisen in debates about human rights evaluation are worth noting.

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<sup>3</sup> Initiating this conversation was a workshop run by the Carr Center for Human Rights at Harvard University, bringing together practitioners and scholars to identify key approaches to and debates concerning impact evaluation in human rights. See Carr Center, *Measurement and Human Rights: Tracking Progress, Assessing Impact*, A Carr Center Project Report, Summer 2005. The Institute for the Study of Human Rights at Columbia University has extended this project, including funding agencies and linking human rights impact evaluation with contiguous areas including development and humanitarian intervention. See Institute for the Study of Human Rights, *Human Rights Impact* (Symposium Report), 2010, available at <http://hrcolumbia.org/impact/>.

<sup>4</sup> Office and the High Commissioner for Human Rights and Equitas, *Evaluating Human Rights Training Activities; A Handbook for Human Rights Educators*. Montreal: UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), 2011.

First, human rights are not a simple object that can be measured. Rather, protecting and promoting human rights involves producing changes that are often intangible and intangibles are difficult to evaluate. For example, human rights projects include those that seek to alter the relationships between rights holders and duty-bearers, to change perceptions, attitudes or value systems of particular groups or the general public, or alter the power dynamics in a community or between different groups. Measuring these changes requires complex methodologies that are likely to be time consuming, labour intensive and expensive. What this means is that often we end up measuring proxy variables chosen because they *can* be measured relatively easily; but we cannot always assume that these proxies actually provide an accurate measure of the variable we wish to track. In simple terms, the practicalities of conducting evaluation often lead organisations to evaluate outputs only. They then infer if they have produced or failed to produce their desired impact. Linking this with aforementioned comments about the tension between 'learning-based evaluation' and 'accountability-based evaluation' and the demands of donors, this may lead to seeking proxies that demonstrate the best possible story.

Second, there is no universally accepted or robust scale or set of indicators in the human rights field. The three most commonly used are Freedom House's 'Freedom in the World Scale' (focusing on civil and political freedoms), the 'Political Terror Scale' (PTS) and the 'Cignarelli Richards Scale' (both focusing on terror or physical integrity abuse). All of them measure at the country level and so are unable to pick up the relatively subtle differences that an intervention might make. An intervention may have had significant, but localised effect, or the effect may still be in train. This is particularly noteworthy with much of the early work on awareness raising. These measures have also been criticised on a number of methodological grounds, such as their reliance on two sources of qualitative data (Amnesty International and US State Department reports) that might themselves be influenced by selection bias factors and thus provide a poor indication of the objective state of human rights. They also measure a very narrow spectrum of rights.

Third, there are a number of difficulties specific to human rights projects. In particular:

- We rarely have accurate baseline data and obtaining such data may be extremely difficult if not impossible;
- The data that is available on the occurrence of violations is not necessarily a good indicator of the actual level of abuse. The most severe violations may be the most under-reported and in fact, early stages of success in human rights work might lead to increased levels of reporting;
- Many of the most important impacts will only be achieved over the long term, but measurement scales are generally relatively short term and linked to discrete project cycles;
- Human rights interventions take place in highly complex environments and as such it is very difficult to isolate causality. Other possible causes for changes we might observe include other human rights interventions as well as large-scale changes like economic improvement or conflict; and
- Unlike prevention work in the fields of public health and health science, where measurements can be more easily quantified, there is an inherent level of subjectivity about human rights. Measuring attitudinal and behavioural change in this field thus requires careful and complex evaluation, often relying heavily on qualitative information. Coupled with the prevailing tensions between security personnel and human rights actors, ascertaining what changes have actually happened as opposed to security personnel saying what they think we want to hear or what they 'should' say' is sometimes difficult.

These problems do not make it impossible to do impact evaluation. They do, however, make it more complicated. Such complexity suggests that the evaluation we are able to do may never in fact tell us what the exact impact of our projects has been or will be.

Fourth, evaluation is never context free and is always linked with particular interests. An evaluation may be driven by the demands of a funding agency or by the organisation itself. Accordingly the primary audience may be the funding body, staff of the organisation that designed and implemented the intervention, partner organisations or the communities and individuals whose rights are in question. These differences are not just a matter of where to send the reports, but are likely to determine the type of evaluation one carries out. For example, if an organisation knows that it will have to provide an evaluation to the funder, there are incentives for it to design projects in a way that will maximise the likelihood that positive measurable outcomes can be achieved, rather than taking on projects that are more experimental, but which may be a necessary stage in the development of effective tools and approaches. Minimising the risk of 'measurable failure' may, in other words, have negative effects in the longer term.

Fifth, people in the human rights field tend to have ambivalent responses to the very idea of evaluation. Human rights work has traditionally had a strong values-base and as such has not been defined around 'returns', but rather around mission and service.<sup>5</sup> This has left a legacy of resistance to evaluation, especially when it is perceived as part of a more general shift towards a culture of managerialism. Some human rights practitioners have been concerned that the introduction of evaluation processes will squeeze out the independence and more radical dimensions of their work, limit experimentation and creativity and displace valuable time with bureaucratic activity.

Impact evaluation in the field of human rights also raises difficult ethical questions. Smaller organisations are often strapped for resources and the problems they are dealing with cry out for every dollar they can dedicate to it. In such situations, allocating funds to what may appear to be a bureaucratic activity can be experienced as insensitive to the urgent needs of real people and communities. Second, if one moves towards robust quantitative evaluation methods that require control and experimental groups, there are real issues about both the fairness of withholding benefits from control groups and making those who are subject to an intervention vulnerable to possible risks.

#### ***(iv) The ideal and the feasible: evaluation methodologies***

Finally, a few words about methodology for conducting evaluations are in order. The best evaluations would seem to be ones that are based on the best methodologies and, as such, it is important to consult experts or conduct appropriate research when designing an evaluation. That said, the reality is that identifying and then being able to actually apply the 'ideal' methodology is not so simple. First, there are significant disagreements amongst social scientists about what type of methodology produces the most accurate findings for an evaluation. Social scientists also disagree about the political implications of different methodologies. Quantitative methodologies, which measure variables numerically, are often held out as the most objective. Qualitative methodologies are more subjective but they also provide more scope for getting at people's experiences and can provide rich information that may be left out in an evaluation that has identified the specific variables it will measure from the outset.

In addition, even if you believe that you have found the most robust evaluation method, it may be impractical to use it in the context of your project. For example, it may be impossible to get accurate baseline or post-intervention data on the specific variable that you want to measure, such as the number of people subjected to torture. Where this is the case, creative approaches, often involving a combination of qualitative and quantitative measures will be needed to try to get a measure of the variable you want to know about. Evaluation is particularly difficult where the projects are dealing with small numbers ('small *n* projects'), as is usually the case with pilots and is often the case in capacity building. Here the changes that you may bring about are unlikely to show up in country-level statistics or other available measures. In small *n* projects, quantitative methods and experimental design (for example randomised controlled trials discussed below), though superior from one point of view, may in fact not be feasible, desirable or appropriate to evaluating impact.<sup>6</sup>

To give an example of the difference between the ideal and the feasible, we might consider the example of randomised control trials. In the field of impact evaluation today, randomised trials in the form of 'field experiments' are increasingly seen as the gold standard for conducting a robust evaluation in the area of social change. In the field experiment method, the 'target group' or 'target population' for the intervention (for example military personnel to be trained, police stations to be monitored) is divided up so as to create two groups – one to be involved in the intervention (the 'intervention group') and one that will have no involvement ('the control group'). The groups are formed using either random selection of participants or other processes to ensure that they are equivalent on any variables that might affect outcomes (prior experience, gender etc.) For example, from a population of soldiers, two groups would be randomly selected and training would then be given to one and not the other. Then, after the intervention takes place, they would be compared in terms of their knowledge of human rights, their respect for human rights and so on.

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<sup>5</sup> Rosabeth Kanter and D. V. Summers, "Doing Well While Doing Good" in W. W. Powell (ed.) *The Non-Profit Sector: A Research Handbook*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987, pp. 154-166.

<sup>6</sup> White, Howard & Phillips, Daniel, "Addressing attribution of cause and effect in small *n* impact evaluations: towards an integrated framework" (Working Paper 15), New Delhi: International Initiative for Impact Evaluation, 2012.



The advantage of this method from a methodological point of view is that it provides the strongest evidence that any difference that one finds is attributable to your specific intervention rather than some other factor. By contrast, even if we measure some variable (say behavioural respect for human rights) before and after our intervention and find an improvement, we do not know if the difference is attributable to our intervention or to some other factor (policy changes in the organisation, other interventions and so on). In this method, where we compare two groups who are otherwise equivalent and where the only difference is that one group has been exposed to the intervention, we can confidently say that any differences we find between them is attributable to that intervention.

As such, this type of evaluation sounds ideal, and as will be discussed below, it is one we considered for the EHRP. The problem is that it is not always possible to design an intervention that will allow you to use it. To put this the other way around, the intervention you wish to do may not be compatible with the field experiment method. For example, an organisation would have to have significant control over selecting who takes part in their intervention and who does not – indeed it would have to be able to assign participants to control and intervention groups. It would also need to be ongoing to assess the ‘intervention’ and ‘control groups’ after the intervention and those groups would need to remain relatively distinct and in-tact. Shifting your project design so that it can accommodate this evaluation method may be beneficial, but it may also unduly distort the intervention itself.

## CHAPTER 2: DESIGNING AN EVALUATION FOR THE EHRP

### (i) *Building evaluation into the project planning*

In any large-scale human rights project, evaluation should not be an add-on or afterthought, but be built into project planning from the outset. This was the case for the EHRP. The logical framework (logframe) model that we adopted for our project planning purposes and that many international donors now require, entails clear articulation of a **specific objective** and the **expected results** that the project will produce as a way of indicating that it has achieved its specific objective. Each of these results then needs to be linked with indicators that measure the extent to which these results have been achieved. In a logframe these are called objectively verifiable indicators (OVIs). The logframe also requires you to state what information you will access to justify these indicators. These are called Means of Verification (MoV). The basic logic here is that when we are thinking about the change we wish to make, we need also to be thinking about how we will know whether we have made this change and what kinds of data or evidence we will need to collect to give us this information.

To illustrate what this looked like for the EHRP, an excerpt from our logframe is reproduced below.

| Logical Framework         |  |   |   |
|---------------------------|--|---|---|
|                           | Intervention Logic   | OVI   | MOVs  |
| <b>Specific Objective</b> | To develop the capacities of state officials to prevent and address torture and ill treatment within the police and military in Sri Lanka and armed police and police in Nepal, thereby contributing to the prevention or reduction of acts of torture and ill treatment | Police, armed police and military leaders from Sri Lanka and Nepal (both civilian and uniformed) publicly pledge a commitment to a holistic rights-based approach to the prevention of torture and ill treatment. Police and military amend their personnel training programs to incorporate this holistic rights-based approach to the prevention of torture and ill treatment. Police and military personnel in the target countries implement organisational changes that reduce the risks of torture and strengthen practices and factors that support respect for human rights.  | Annual reports outlining project results. Mid term and Final Independent evaluation report. Partner project reports. Report of International Conference, including presentations by Associates. |
| <b>Expected Result 1</b>  | Increased global knowledge about the root causes of torture within military and police settings, including recognition and understanding of the effect of cultural and political variations.   | Production of a report (500 copies) on existing anti-torture programs in militaries, police forces around the world. Production of a report (500 copies) on multidisciplinary research into the cultural and social factors that support the practice of torture and ill treatment in police/military. Production of a comprehensive report (500 copies) "Addressing the Root Causes of Torture: Research Report on Actions to Reduce and Prevent Torture in Police and Military settings in the Asia Pacific region." Establishment of annotated bibliography of existing anti-torture and human rights training programs used by military and police. Articles published that specifically relate to this project. Published reports by international experts in their field of expertise about this project. | Annual project reports<br>Mid-term and Final Independent Evaluation project. Project website. Partner Project Reports   |

Table 1: Excerpt from the EHRP logical framework.

An important point to note here is that the specific objective of the EHRP was “to develop the capacities of state officials to prevent and address torture and ill treatment within the police and military in Sri Lanka and armed police and police in Nepal”. This capacity building was intended to contribute to the overall objective (the prevention or reduction of acts of torture and ill treatment), but torture prevention *per se* was not the specific objective of this project. As such, the evaluation needs to be oriented around the question of whether the project was effective in building the capacity of state officials in Nepal and Sri Lanka to prevent and address torture.

As one can see in this table, the project plan establishes that one will know if this specific objective has been achieved if the project successfully produces explicitly identified results. Each of these expected results is in turn tied with specific MoVs that will tell us if the result has been produced and that point to where the evaluation should focus to find this out.

At one level, and looking at our logframe and MoVs, this seems relatively straightforward. For example, the logframe establishes that Expected Result 1 (Increased global knowledge about the root causes of torture within military and police settings, including recognition and understanding of the effect of cultural and political variations) was to be verified in part by adducing evidence of the production of certain publications based on research on the root causes of torture and the dissemination of research reports. Similarly, Expected Result 2 (Increased capacity amongst the military, armed police and police of the target countries to reject torture as an acceptable behaviour, to act to prevent or curtail its use, and to embrace a rights-based approach to their dealings with detainees and suspects) was to be verified through evidence of a certain number of Human Rights Protection Facilitators developing and implementing projects to enhance human rights in their workplaces and those projects engaging a certain number of personnel.

That said, the initial evaluation plans that are built into the initial project design provide less guidance and detail than one might anticipate. First, as discussed in earlier *Issues Papers*, just as there needs to be flexibility in adjusting the project as it unfolds, so too evaluation plans will have to track any project changes. This is particularly true for a project such as the EHRP, where the first phase involves research that is intended to provide data that will shape what is done in later phases. Where the research indicates that there should be a change of direction in the project, and that different activities will be required to produce the expected results, the evaluation plans will also need to change. This was the case for the EHRP, where our research indicated that we should shift from a training model for capacity building to one that involved building the capacity of security personnel to identify and address risk factors for torture. Evaluating this type of capacity building required a different approach. At the same time, some elements persisted through the change. For example, in both cases, the capacity building model entailed increasing the understanding of and commitment to the prevention of torture amongst the people we were working with.

Second, the actual methodology of the evaluation still has to be specified. For example, one still needs to work out what type of ‘qualitative research’ will be undertaken to ‘demonstrate an improvement in human rights awareness, knowledge, attitudes and behaviours of police and military personnel engaged with the project’. In addition, the evaluation of the results needs to be tied back to the specific objective so as to ensure that one does not end up measuring outputs and outcomes, without thinking through how they are related to the desired impact of the project. In this regard, and as will be discussed below, a robust evaluation needs to drill down into the results to think about them not only in gross terms (for example was research conducted?) but also in more fine grained qualitative terms (was the research designed and carried out in such a way as to produce useful results?). In this sense, one can conclude that it is necessary to build evaluation into project planning from the outset, while also appreciating that evaluation, like the project itself, needs to be dynamic.

## **(ii) Ambitious plans and the need for a variegated evaluation strategy**

In the early stages of the EHRP, the project team began to look at different evaluation methodologies to try to identify approaches that would provide us with the most robust evidence of the impact of our work. One approach that particularly impressed us was the field experiment method discussed above. Unlike other methods, where causality is very difficult to attribute because it is so challenging to separate out the specific intervention of the project from all of the other variables that could have effects (both negative and positive), the field experiment method can isolate the effect of your intervention.

As is always the case, however, the choice of evaluation methodology and the project design need to be thought about in tandem. In this case, using the field experiment method would have required a project design where we created intervention groups and control groups, worked with the former only and then measured outcomes in the two sets of groups over time. Given that our project was seeking to build the capacity of security personnel so

that they could better address and prevent torture, we envisaged two ways of doing this. On one model, we could randomly sample from a pool of individual security personnel, work with them and then look at the outcomes in terms of their individual attitudes and behaviours and the influence they had on those around them and on the structures in which they worked. On a second model, we envisaged selecting entire groups - for example police stations or military units - and then comparing these with control groups. When it came to moving forward with these plans, however they proved unworkable. This was firstly because this design demanded that project team have complete control over the choice of personnel involved in the project as well as access to a significant amount of data about the pool of individuals from which we would be choosing in order to randomly sample for group selection, neither of which we had. Second, in both Sri Lanka and Nepal, security personnel are frequently transferred, meaning that it would be very difficult to retain the distinction between control and intervention groups as either groups were broken up, or individuals moved in and out of contexts.

As such, we decided that we needed to adopt alternative methods that would identify a range of sources of information that would assist us to work out if our intervention achieved the desired results. In doing so, and as noted above, we thought that it was important not only to look at the achievement of the principal expected results identified in the logframe, but also at the different components of the project, and to drill down into how those different parts had worked individually and then as a suite. In planning the evaluation, we went back to the logic of the project, which can be set out as a series of linked hypotheses:

- a. If we conduct sound research, including empirical and conceptual multi-disciplinary research on the root causes of torture, then we will be in a position to develop a sound understanding on the root causes of torture in Nepal and Sri Lanka.
- b. If we conduct sound research on how to transform the processes, structures and cultures of organisations, then we will have a robust set of tools for designing our intervention.
- c. If we understand the root causes of torture and have a robust theory for how to bring about change to key areas implicated in the root cause analysis, then we will be able to develop a sound Theory of Change.
- d. If we have a sound Theory of Change, supplemented by a good understanding of project design, a sound understanding of the intervention context and tools we can draw on, we can develop an intervention plan (a change strategy).
- e. If we put in place strong processes for developing trusting relationships with the Associates, we will be in a position to gain their agreement to cooperate in the intervention plan.
- f. If we have an intervention plan (supplemented by the body of our research and the skills of the team), we can develop a series of processes (workshops, tools, training material) that will develop the capacities of members of the police and military to address some of the root causes of torture in their organisation (as analysed in the research).
- g. If the members of the military and police participate in the processes that we develop for them, they will be able to develop processes and interventions that will bring about changes to some of the processes, structures and cultures that we have found to be root causes of torture.

Tracking this program logic, we can then identify a series of components of the project that need to be evaluated, articulated here as a series of questions:

- a. Was our research methodology and research practice sound and did it produce reliable data and findings about the root causes of torture?
- b. Were the organisational factors that we identified as creating risks for torture or providing protective factors correctly identified?
- c. Was our research on organisational and normative change sound and did it produce a body of useful findings?
- d. Was our reasoning and theory development sound and did our Theory of Change represent a reasonable interpretation of the research?
- e. Did the intervention that we developed follow from our Theory of Change and our research findings?
- f. Did we develop sufficiently robust relationships with the Associates to support buy-in, engagement and support for the intervention?
- g. Did the workshops and other processes that we designed provide sound processes for delivering the intervention design? Did our workshops build the capacities (including knowledge, attitudes and skills) of the participants to develop projects to address organisational risks and protective factors? Did the other tools with which we provided them assist them in this process?
- h. Did the projects identified by the HRPFs appropriate target risk and protective factors in their organisations?
- i. Did the HRPFs successfully develop such projects?
- j. Were their projects successful in achieving their objectives?

Although no single part of this evaluation provides an answer to the question of whether the project effectively developed the capacity of personnel in security and law enforcement organisations to resist and prevent torture, their combination does assist us in evaluating the overall success of the project. What is more, it assists in evaluating which components were more or less successful and as such designing fine-grained modifications.

With this map in hand, combined with the evaluation plans set out in the original logframe, we developed an evaluation strategy comprising three principal components. In the first, we sought to evaluate the research that we conducted, focusing on the quality and robustness of the research process, the usefulness of the findings and move from the research findings to the development of the Theory of Change. Second, our project teams conducted internal evaluations of the HRPF projects, based on the evaluation plans that they had developed as part of their original project plans, supplemented by interviews with the HRPFs themselves and other personnel who had been involved in their projects. Third, an external evaluator conducted a detailed evaluation, focusing on the impact of the projects conducted by the HRPFs and also more broadly assessing whether the EHRP expected results set out in the logframe and the specific objective of the EHRP had been achieved. Below we discuss the methods adopted in each of these components. In keeping with the steps of the project set out above, we have arranged the discussion under three topics: evaluation of the research, evaluation of the EHRP projects and overall evaluation of the expected results and specific objective.

### ***(iii) The principal pillars of evaluation for the EHRP***

#### **(a) Evaluation of the research**

To evaluate the research that we had conducted, we adopted the “DELPHI” technique, a method originally developed for forecasting future trends, but also applicable for monitoring and evaluation. This technique entails several steps that together provide a type of deliberative expert assessment. First, a group of experts in the field who are not directly involved in the project are invited to participate. Second, they are sent evaluative questions about the project. Their answers are then summarised, anonymised and shared across the group as a way of generating further reflection and to provide participants the opportunity to rethink their answers in the light of others’ responses. The final set of answers including further reflections and modifications provides the evaluation. The advantage of the method is that it collects assessments from a range of differently placed experts and also provides a forum in which they can reflect on their own views in the light of others’ opinions so as to deepen their responses. In this way, this method provides richer data than would be generated either by asking a single expert to provide an assessment or even a set of experts in isolation from each other.

To select the pool of experts, we drew on people who had participated in the International Conference in September 2014 and so had some familiarity with the project. We also selected people from across small and large civil society organisations and academia, ensuring that we included people from the two countries in which we had worked and a gender balance. We invited twelve people to participate in the process, eleven of who agreed and nine of whom finally participated in the full process. To support their assessments, we sent them the full suite of Issues Papers (save the Evaluation and Puttalam papers) as well as a specifically prepared document describing the research methodology and design and a description of how the research was actually carried out. They were asked to answer the following questions:

1. Was our research methodology and research practice sound?
2. Did it produce reliable findings about root causes of torture?
3. Were the organisational factors that we identified as creating risks for torture or providing protective factors correctly identified?
4. Was our research on organisational change sound?
5. Did it produce a body of useful findings?
6. Did the Theory of Change that we developed represent a reasonable interpretation of the research findings?
7. Did the Theory of Change provide a sound basis for moving from the research findings to a practical intervention?

The participants were then sent a document summarising the collective contributions. Each of the original questions was transformed into a statement, depending on the responses that had been received. For example, the first question, “Was our research methodology and research practice sound?” became: “The research methodology and research practice was sound”. Under this statement were listed the responses that agreed with this statement and then the reservations or disagreements that had been expressed. Participants were asked to review this analysis and to respond if they disagreed with the comments or where the reflection sparked a change or development in their views. This final set of responses then provided us with data on their considered assessments, discussed in Chapter Three below.

## (b) Evaluation of the EHRP projects

As discussed in detail in *Issues Paper 6, From Structural Analysis to Structural Intervention* and *Issues Paper 7, Case Studies from Nepal and Sri Lanka: Human Rights Protection Facilitator Projects*, the 'implementation' component of the overall EHRP comprised developing the capacity of selected HRPFs from each of the Associate organisations to develop projects that would identify and then address risk factors for torture in their part of their organisation. Drawing on the project planning methodology of the entire project, the project plans that they developed also included a specific objective, expected results, actions and an evaluation plan including MoVs and OVIs. For example, in the project described in *Issues Paper 7* where police personnel were trained to use the PEACE method of interrogation, the MoV for Expected Result 1 (Effective and efficient use of the PEACE Model to interview suspects/witnesses without use of force) was an increase in the overall witness interview performance of the officers based on pre-and post-test interviews and the OVI was pre-and post-test interview results. In this same project, for the action 'Provide a separate interview room', the MoV was 'a separate interview room is completed by the time the PEACE Model training is ready to be implemented' and the OVI was 'Room booking sheet –i.e. used by those officers who are trained to use the PEACE Model and photos of new room and its features'.

In the first instance, the country based project teams used these evaluation plans as a guide to evaluate each of the HRPFs projects. In those cases where the HRPFs had not developed sufficient evaluation plans in their original project planning, the project teams needed to develop evaluation methods retrospectively. A significant part of the evaluation conducted by the project teams comprised analysis of the documentation of the projects, interviews with the HRPFs, their juniors, seniors and peers and observation of any processes that they had put into place. Each of the two country teams worked with the project director to produce detailed evaluation reports of all of the HRPF projects.

The external evaluator was also commissioned to evaluate the HRPF projects, but this analysis of the HRPFs projects was more broadly embedded in the evaluation of the impact of the EHRP. Rather than simply looking at what changes we could see and then attribute to the project, the evaluator adopted a modified 'Contribution Analysis approach', which is one of the four main approaches recommended for evaluating small *n* projects in international development.<sup>7</sup> Contribution Analysis looks to build a body of evidence that a particular intervention contributed to a particular result or impact, by gathering evidence around each link in the program's Theory of Change. It develops a "credible contribution story"<sup>8</sup> that explicitly recognises that a specific intervention on its own is unlikely to be the sole cause of an impact. It recommends evaluators look for evidence to confirm that the intervention has played a role in an observed change using the Theory of Change. It then also uses evidence to rule out other plausible explanations for how any change might have come about.

The process for carrying out a Contribution Analysis comprises the following six steps:

1. Set out the issue to be addressed and acknowledge the causal problem, including an assessment of the magnitude of the expected contribution of the program, given its size.
2. Develop the Theory of Change (and explicitly state rival explanations and other influencing factors).
3. Use the existing results to gather existing evidence of the Theory of Change as well as of other influencing factors and/or rival explanations.
4. Assemble the contribution story, and any challenges to it that come from rival explanations or influencing factors.
5. Seek out new evidence.
6. Revise and review the contribution story (and repeat step 4 and upwards).<sup>9</sup>

In practice and for the purposes of this evaluation, it was clear that it would not be feasible to conduct an analysis of all of the causal links in the Theory of Change and as such that a specific focus had to be chosen. Going back to the causal chain set out on page 10, the decision was made to focus on the link specifically addressing project's work in building the capacity building of the HRPFs to address the root causes of torture: *If the members of the military and police participate in the processes that we develop for them, they will be able to develop processes and interventions that will bring about changes to some of the processes, structures and cultures that we have found to be root causes of torture (g).*

<sup>7</sup> H. White, & D. Phillips, "Addressing Attribution". This links back with the earlier discussion about the difficulty of attributing causality to a specific intervention in the human rights field.

<sup>8</sup> John Mayne, "Addressing Attribution through Contribution Analysis: Using Performance Measures Sensibly", *Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation*, 16(1), 2001, 1-24, at 21.

<sup>9</sup> John Mayne, "Contribution analysis: Coming of age?" *Evaluation: The International Journal of Theory, Research and Practice*, 18(3), 2012, 270-280.

This specific part of the overall causal story was thought to be particularly important because it was closest to the specific objective of the EHRP (to develop the capacity of security personal to address and prevent torture). As such, evaluating this link was thought to provide evidence for addressing whether the EHRP as a whole met its specific objective.

To commence the evaluation process, the evaluator formed an Evaluation Team comprising herself, the Project Director and the Project Manager. She then carried out a series of activities tracking the six steps set out above.

First, a workshop was held with the Evaluation Team to agree upon the attribution problem to be addressed and to assess how large a contribution the EHRP magnitude could be expected to make (Step 1). The project team had already developed the Theory of Change (corresponding to step 2), but it was felt that this needed to be translated into a more explicit Impact Pathway focused on the step of the Theory of Change that was being evaluated. This Impact Pathway is set out below along with the assumptions and risks associated with it:




Figure 2: The Impact Pathway used for the evaluation of the EHRP project.

The Evaluation team then identified which parts of this Impact Pathway were contested or not agreed upon by all stakeholders and observers and what the bases for their disagreements were. The evaluator also worked with the team to identify rival explanations and other influencing factors that needed to be considered. These were synthesised to identify the most important potential rival plausible explanations for any outcomes or changes observed.

The next step (corresponding to step 3) was to gather existing evidence of the Impact Pathway. To do this, the evaluator considered:

- The HRPFs workbooks (although these were of uneven quality);
- The internal evaluation reports being prepared by the local teams in Sri Lanka and Nepal;
- Media reports on individual projects;
- Narrative reports from the project partners; and
- The *Issues Papers* and presentations prepared for the International Conference.

An assessment was also conducted of the assumptions of and risks to the Impact Pathway, as well as of plausible rival explanations and whether the evidence could be considered reasonable.

On the basis of the findings of step 3, the evaluator then assembled a contribution story (step 4) and worked with the Evaluation Team to identify the main weaknesses in this story. That is, they looked together at the story and considered the gaps or weaknesses that may make it incorrect or might call into question whether the project had had the effects that were being attributed to it. Several possible gaps or weaknesses were identified, specifically:

- That there might be a self-report bias;
- That the changes found might already have been under way in any case;
- That the wrong people were chosen as HRPFs and so they were not in positions to actually address root causes; and
- That the transfer of the HRPFs undermined the sustainability of the changes.

It was on the basis of these possible gaps or weaknesses that the evaluator then developed her plans to gather further evidence (step 5).

She then went into the field to gather evidence for the contribution story and rival explanations, including attending to the further evidence identified during step 4. To do this, she conducted fieldwork on the projects developed by the HRPFs including doing the following:

- Conducting interviews with HRPFs about their projects, their experience of the capacity building activities, the changes they had experienced as a result of their involvement in the EHRP and the impacts of their projects;
- Conducting interviews with subordinates and superiors of HRPFs to verify claims made by HRPFs;
- Looking for tangible evidence to support or discount the HRPFs' claims of success, if any;
- Conducting interviews with security force leadership specifically asking about the claims made by the HRPFs and whether the changes would have occurred without the EHRP project;
- Asking senior people in the security forces and project teams if they thought the correct people were selected;
- Looking for evidence of addressing the root causes of torture and ill treatment in HRPFs' projects; and
- Asking HRPFs and security forces leaders about the sustainability of the changes, in light of internal transfers.



Detailed research was collected on a selection of the HRPFs using Brinkerhoff's Success Case Method (SCM).<sup>10</sup> This method involves two stages. First, a simple (telephone or written) survey is administered to the target groups asking to what extent are they using the tools from the intervention and with what results. This process is used to identify 'outliers' – those extremely successful and unsuccessful.<sup>11</sup> From these outliers, several participants are purposefully selected for the second stage of the process: a case study to 'dig deeper' into the reasons of their success/failure and the extent of their success.

The results of the findings from this body of collected evidence and analysis were then used to develop a final contribution story that was set out by the external evaluator in an independent report and are summarised in the next chapter.

### (c) Overall evaluation of the EHRP

The external evaluator also evaluated the overall EHRP using the logframe as a guide. This part of the evaluation entailed monitoring as well as evaluation insofar as it was undertaken primarily for accountability purposes. The methods included a desk review of documents, interviews with key stakeholders, and a workshop with the program staff.

The evaluator asked for a range of documents to be made available at the beginning of the evaluation and then subsequently during the interview period including:

- Project Application documentation;
- Reporting information to the European Commission;
- Partner Quarterly reports;
- Research reports and papers; and
- Composition of various governance and advisory committees under the project.

Several categories of key stakeholders groups that needed to be represented amongst the subjects chosen for interview were identified. These included: Project staff (in all three country sites); the Steering Committee; commissioned experts; HRPFs; colleagues/supervisors of HRPFs; Reference Groups in Sri Lanka and Nepal including senior representatives of the Associates; and the External Advisory Committee.

Thirty-eight stakeholders from across these groups in Nepal, Sri Lanka and Australia were interviewed face to face between February 9<sup>th</sup> and March 15<sup>th</sup> 2015. Most interviewees spoke English but where English was difficult, an interpreter was used for consecutive interpretation.<sup>12</sup>

They were asked a range of questions including questions about the strengths and weaknesses of the project, concerns about the implementation of the project and their perceptions of any unintended outcomes of the project. The evaluator summarised and provided indicative quotes of their answers in her final report and also drew on them to assess the achievements of the project.

The evaluator assessed achievements against the specific metrics that had been set out in the logframe. That is, the logframe established that the EHRP would conduct a certain body of research, produce and disseminate a certain number of publications, work directly with a certain number of security personnel who would in turn work with a certain number of other security personnel and so on. Each of these was independently assessed and reported upon. In this context and again linking back with the earlier discussion about the challenges of evaluation, the evaluator distinguished between outputs, outcomes and impacts and considered whether it was possible to move from outputs to impacts. The findings are discussed in the following chapter.

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<sup>10</sup> Robert O. Brinkerhoff, *The success case method: find out quickly what's working and what's not*, San Francisco, CA: Berrett-Koehler, 2003.

<sup>11</sup> The results that were obtained from the survey made it difficult to identify outliers so this data was supplemented by asking project staff of recommendations of the best outliers to interview. In total, nine cases were selected for further in-depth study.

<sup>12</sup> Participant information statements and consent forms were provided to all interviewees in English and/or their first language. All interviewees were provided with transcripts of the interviews to check.

## CHAPTER THREE: KEY FINDINGS FROM THE EVALUATIONS

Below is a brief summary of the key findings from each of the distinct evaluation tools we used. They are presented as: A. The Evaluation of the Research; B. The Evaluation of the HRPF Projects; and C. Overall Evaluation Using the Logical Framework.

### A. Evaluation of the Research (DELPHI)

As noted earlier there were seven key questions explored by the DELPHI method, each prompting critical reflection upon the steps involved in the research and the analysis that flowed from each step. The reflections of the expert panel are presented below as seven statements summarising the experts' overall answer to the question. The reasoning supporting their evaluation of each key step is briefly outlined. The experts also made a number of comments that were tangential or that contested the majority view and these are included where they provide important insights.

The expert panel reached broad consensus on all questions except one – the seventh question looking at the whether the Theory of Change provided a sound basis for moving from the research findings to a practical intervention. In retrospect, given that the panel was not provided with detailed information about the way in which the Theory of Change was actually developed and translated into the intervention strategy, it is clear that this question should have been modified or supplemented with a further question that attended to the more detailed intervention plan. Nevertheless, the results are included for reasons of completeness.

*1. The research methodology and research practice were sound* because they focused on organisational, cultural, legal and political factors. Root causes not just symptoms were identified and addressed. The project took an experimental and multi-disciplinary approach. The methodology and practice harmonised well with existing research. They comprised a comprehensive approach bringing theoretical understandings of complex and contested phenomena to bear on the concrete practices of security sector personnel.

Experts also raised issues concerning:

- The importance of making clear in the findings the parameters of the sampling approach used in the data collection;
- The need to include more data from the observations in the analysis;
- The difficulties that might arise when the methodology includes asking actors subject to the intervention to identify the issues at stake for themselves. This may enhance a sense of “ownership” of the solutions and interventions following from them but there is the danger that the stakeholder will identify factors that they find unpleasant in their working environment, but which may not actually be part of the chain of causation leading to torture; and
- Greater weight could have been placed on the views of civil society.

*2. The research produced reliable findings about root causes of torture* because the findings seemed logical and consistent with understandings of some of the causes of torture. The findings about the root causes provided a useful lens to analyse patterns and practices of security sector personnel. They are based on a range of studies and careful and cogent meta-analysis on the part of the research team. The findings involving organisational change and cultural factors provided a different angle to those normally considered by human rights defenders. The findings acknowledge that there is not just one answer to the question of what are the root causes of torture.

Experts also raised issues concerning:

- The term root cause may not be altogether useful as important factors may actually be superficial and banal. An alternative approach may have been to ask, ‘under what conditions does torture thrive?’ or ‘what sustains it?’ The ‘causes’ question seems to trigger people in many different ways; and
- The distinction of torture and other terms used could have been clearer.

*3. The organisational factors that we identified as creating risks for torture or providing protective factors were correctly identified* because the list of factors is comprehensive and the causation makes a lot of sense. It also recognises that ordinary contextual factors can promote the use of torture. This aspect of the research makes a persuasive case for the factors identified, particularly about the necessity to develop ecological models relating causal factors to one another, the recognition that causality in itself is multi-dimensional and that organisational change is not just about appealing to our better natures.

Experts also raised issues concerning:

- The difficulty of deciding which interventions to pursue to bring about change when so many causal factors are identified; and
- The cause-effect relation that could be turned on its head here. When the police and military have not used torture for an extended period, social attitudes move towards less acceptance of such behaviour.

*4. Our research on organisational change was sound* because the research has genuinely covered organisational issues and its related matters. The findings made sense and were consistent with experiences and understandings of the topic. The research was comprehensive with a multi-dimensional focus. It considered perceptions of people inside as well as outside the security sector organisations, and also at multiple levels within the security sector organisations. The contribution has a wider resonance than just police and military organisation. The research is valuable because it concisely summarises other work – it provides a meta-narrative.

Experts also raised issues concerning:

- The importance of referencing literature on postcolonial bureaucracies and development in the Global South;
- A question about the assumption that security sector organisations are fully rational bureaucratic structures as distinct from their performance being linked with illegitimate state structures that need to be supported by an excessive show of force;
- The themes of governance, survival and reform (Jefferson) that emerged in prior research seem central to the police and security sector too;
- A crucial factor would be dissatisfaction amongst a sufficient part of the organisation with the current situation and a real wish to make changes; and
- A word of caution about overdependence on theories from organisational change and public health. It is only through the concrete application and evaluation of how these theories play out in the context of security sector practices that we can evaluate their value.

*5. Our research on organisational change produced a body of useful findings* because they are useful findings for a range of stakeholders including donors, policy makers and researchers. The findings are likely to be very useful for practitioners in the field. It often seems to be the case that NGOs and field workers are so caught up in practical aspects of project implementation that they do not do review and evaluation, theoretical consideration of issues, nor overarching big picture analysis nearly as much as they should. The findings in a theoretical sense are interesting but also the practical translation of them (e.g. the training manual) will provide a good, quick and practical summary for practitioners. The question then becomes how practitioners can be made aware of these tools and resources.

The findings provide the platform for expansion of the project as well as encouraging examination of what has been the actual impact of all the work on prevention of torture. They prompt the opportunity for changing and expanding our ways of thinking on prevention, in similar ways to the conversation that is taking place in relation to aid effectiveness. The findings are also being drawn upon for on-going projects in the security sector in the region.

Experts also raised issues concerning the intended audiences for the findings and the need to develop a revised dissemination strategy that meets the needs of different audiences.

*6. The Theory of Change that we developed represented a reasonable interpretation of the research findings* because it highlights the importance of finding and enabling champions to initiate change from within. The research is highly sensitive to the contingencies of every day practice in security sector work. The recognition by the Theory of Change that the role played by insiders in the promotion of change is an important corrective to the still dominant mainstream belief that 'howling at the gates' on the basis of security sectors' failure to live up to externally defined criteria, will bring about transformation.

Experts also raised issues concerning:

- The need to strengthen the Theory of Change by outlining some of the propositions and assumptions made in its composition; and
- The various caveats and qualifications included in the research findings are valuable to remind readers that there are no easy recipes for deciphering realities on the ground or changing them.

7. The seventh and last question asked *whether the Theory of Change provided a sound basis for moving from the research findings to a practical intervention*. As noted, there was no consensus reached by the expert panel. Some interesting and contested reflections are outlined below:

- Credit should be given to the team for taking the extra step and not being satisfied with simply making academic analyses or gathering empirical knowledge to then share and disseminate in the hope that practitioners will run with it. Venturing into practitioner territory wearing academic garb is a risky business. One might hope that this gesture might be reciprocated by practitioners paying more serious attention to critical theorising about interventions and their conditions of possibility;
- Enabling officers with this structure to be the catalysts of change is a very strategic and practical intervention. Since the intervention was from within the organisation it has a much higher chance of bringing about positive change;
- Moving away from traditional human rights training, this practical intervention in preventing torture is a good example for other organisations promoting human rights;
- The Theory of Change's systemic emphasis very clearly relates to the ecological model. For practical reasons the project has focused on one aspect of this system – the organisational level. This important scoping decision could have been reflected/qualified directly in the Theory of Change; and
- To what extent did the project, in practice, recruit the actors, who had been identified as the right change agents? If the armed forces are getting to decide who these 'change agents' are then there is no guarantee that the criteria applied by the armed forces are the ideal ones for finding those who would be most successful change agents. However, it may be a pragmatic reality of working with forces that you need to let them have ownership and control to some extent over these decisions, as their buy-in would be essential. Perhaps if some 'criteria for change agents' was mutually agreed and some sort of selection panel consisting of researches and armed forces people could be a way to enhance the efficacy of this part assuming that this is feasible with the Nepalese and Sri Lankan armed forces.

## **B. Evaluation of the HRPFs Projects**

The HRPFs projects in both Sri Lanka and Nepal underwent two forms of evaluation; first by our in-country project teams and second by an independent external evaluator. This next section looks at the results and findings from our internal evaluation.

### ***(i) Internal Evaluation***

In both Nepal and Sri Lanka members of our in-country project teams interviewed the HRPFs in their local languages. A number of focus group discussions were also held with the HRPFs and the junior officers who were the beneficiaries of or participants in their projects. The HRPFs were asked to reflect on their project activities, how far their projects went in achieving their original objective and whether they could link their work back to the 'goals-oriented' logic they used when defining and designing their projects. As outlined in *Issues Paper 6, From Structural Analysis to Structural Intervention*, the HRPFs mapped the situational factors contributing to use of torture in their part of the organisations using a SWOT tool and then investigated the root causes of one of these factors using a problem tree. The objective of their projects then centred on addressing one of these identified root causes. At this stage, we sought to move back along this logical chain to see if the actual projects had addressed a problem that they had identified as creating a risk for torture.

The internal evaluation then explored a number of thematic areas including project preparation design, effectiveness, outcomes and impacts, sustainability and finally any challenges or lessons learnt. Below we present the findings by country, then (a) summarise the process, (b) set out some of the outputs, outcomes and impacts for each project, (c) summarise the overall findings and (d) offer some reflections.

## **Nepal**

### ***(a) Summary of the process***

Of the twelve HRPF projects conducted in Nepal, our internal evaluation team conducted interviews with 11 HRPFs, as well as a further 11 Focus Group Discussions with the HRPFs' subordinates. One HRPF (HRPF UV) was unavailable to participate in this evaluation as he had already been dispatched for a United Nations mission and was not contactable.

In the project planning stage, each HRPF had been asked to complete an evaluation framework detailing their project activities, expected results and objective, as well as indicators and means of verification for each (as discussed in *Issues Paper 6*). The work of completing these evaluation plans required significant and unanticipated support from the support teams in all project sites, resulting in a number of consultations and rounds of drafting the evaluation plans, brainstorming on what indicators were available to the HRPFs and strategising how they might obtain this information. This unexpected hurdle during the HRPF project-planning phase resulted in two unexpected but also positive outcomes. First, it meant that by the time of the evaluation interviews, the in-country teams already had a sound knowledge of the projects that each of the HRPFs had undertaken. Second, this back and forth process challenged the HRPFs to be critically reflective about how they actually intended to carry out their activities, how they could realistically determine whether they had been successful and about the ways they might measure their project results. As the HRPFs frequently told the project staff, this level of reflexivity was something that did not often happen in a command-based organisational structure where following orders and respecting hierarchy is paramount.

(b) Summary of the Evaluation by project

For ease of reference, the HRPF projects in Nepal are summarised in the table below along with the numbers of officers involved in each project.

| Nepal  |   |  |   |
|--|---|--|---|
| HRPF   | Service Place   | Project Title  | Numbers reached   |
| <b>HRPF NO<sup>13</sup></b>                        | Area Police Office, Kakarvitta, Jhapa                             | Strengthening the Area Police reward and punishment system   | 154 Junior Police Officers  |
| <b>HRPF OP</b>                                     | District Police Office, Kalaiya, Bara                             | Reducing mistreatment of drug abusers by enhancing the capacity of police personnel  | 72 Junior Police Officers   |
| <b>HRPF PQ</b>                                     | District Police Office, Baitadi                                   | Improving good public relation by reducing the stress level and increasing efficiency and performance of the junior police staff   | 31 Junior Police Officers   |
| <b>HRPF QR</b>                                     | Metropolitan Police Commissioner's Office, Ranipokhari, Kathmandu | Increasing transparency by bringing cultural change in work place at Metropolitan Police Commissioner's Office   | 28 Junior Police Officers   |
| <b>HRPF RS</b>                                     | District Police Office, Parsa                                     | Enhancing capacity of police personnel to use force lawfully during arrest and crowd control   | 65 Junior Police Officers   |
| <b>HRPF ST</b>                                     | District Police Office, Palpa                                     | Equipping police personnel working in the District Police Office, Palpa to internalise the concept of the Peace Model and use it in all their interrogations   | 13 Junior Police Officers   |
| <b>HRPF TU</b>                                     | Metropolitan Police Range, Hanumandhoka Kathmandu                 | Enhancing the capacity of police personnel for effective and efficient use of the PEACE model  | 11 Junior Police Officers   |
| <b>HRPF UV</b>                                     | District Police Office, Dhanusha                                  | Creating a victim friendly environment by enhancing the capacity of the Women and Children's Cell in District Police Office, Dhanusha  | 63 Junior Police Officers   |
| <b>HRPF VW<br/>HRPF WX<br/>HRPF XY<br/>HRPF YZ</b> | APF HQ, Halchowk, Kathmandu                                       | Development of expertise and curriculum for specific human rights training of female staff   | 36 Junior Police Officers   |
| <b>HRPF ZZ</b>                                     | Armed Police Force (APF), Siddhakali Batalion, Pakali, Sunsari    | Increasing the capacity of APF Instructors of Siddhakali Battalion in delivering human rights training   | 6 Officers trained as trainers<br>53 Junior Police Officers trained by these trainers |
| <b>HRPF ZA</b>                                     | APF STF Battalion, Halchowk, Kathmandu                            | Developing an effective audio-visual tool as an HR educational material  | 89 Junior Police Officers   |
| <b>HRPF ZB</b>                                     | APF Revenue Control and Security Company, Kakarvitta, Jhapa       | Building the capacity of junior personnel of the APF Revenue Control and Security Company in Kakarvitta to protect human rights of the members of the public through minimisation of improper use of force | 88 Junior Police Officers   |

Table 2: HRPF Project Summaries Nepal

<sup>13</sup> The names of the HRPFs have been anonymised using sequencing from letters of the alphabet.

The table below sets out the outputs and outcomes that the internal evaluators identified for each HRPF, based on the interviews and focus group discussions conducted. We have also selected some statements from those HRPFs and junior officers that are indicative of the potential longer-term impact of these projects.

| Internal Evaluation of HRPF Projects in Nepal |  |   |
|---|--|---|
| HRPF NO                                       | <b>Output:</b> Systematic reward and punishment system and guidelines that link behaviour with respect for human rights produced and operationalized.  | <b>Outcome:</b> Border police at Kakarvita improve their professional standards and the importance of human rights in their workplace. A further outcome is an improvement in public perceptions of police. |
|   | <b>Indicator of Impact:</b> <i>"Previously we used to act as we wished without supervision. But we know these days our activities are monitored."</i>  |   |
| HRPF OP                                       | <b>Output:</b> Awareness program among police personnel and wider community about drug addiction and its management.   | <b>Outcome:</b> The idea that drug abuse is a health related problem and drug users should not be treated as criminals simply because of their addiction is enshrined.                                      |
|   | <b>Indicator of Impact:</b> <i>"Initially we regarded drug abusers as bad groups of people naming and tagging them differently, but after the training we have realised they need to be treated as the victims rather than culprits or criminals. We have therefore changed our perspective on handling them and knew we are keen to help them like doctors help patients"</i> |   |
| HRPF PQ                                       | <b>Output:</b> Creation of suggestion box and stress management training program to increase level of interpersonal skills and coping strategies for police stress. Development and implementation of work place human rights training.  | <b>Outcome:</b> For the first time police have an avenue to voice their grievances and have these addressed in the workplace.   |
|   | <b>Indicator of Impact:</b> <i>"The mechanisms of stress management by sports and yoga, has made us close and as one family. The training on human rights and communication techniques have taught us to give service to people with a smile and ultimately benefiting in terms of human rights protection work."</i>  |   |
| HRPF QR                                       | <b>Output:</b> computerised and shared database of staff appraisals.   | <b>Outcome:</b> transparent system to evaluate staff performance.   |
|   | <b>Indicator of Impact:</b> <i>"As my performances on human rights are keenly monitored by my supervisor and also by my peers as they too have access to my files in the computerised evaluation system, I cannot hide my behaviours and attitudes on human rights protection as it will be now reported and could hinder my promotion"</i>                                    |   |
| HRPF RS                                       | <b>Output:</b> Written guidelines and pamphlets specifying the specific roles and duties of personnel at different ranks during riot control.  | <b>Outcome:</b> Improvement on the existing 'Use of Force' training manual which was too vague and difficult to implement in real life settings.  |
|   | <b>Indicator of Impact:</b> <i>"The guidelines have helped them become more knowledgeable about 'what to do' and 'what not to do' in managing crowds."</i>   |   |
| HRPF ST & HRPF TU                             | <b>Outputs:</b> Training of junior officers on the PEACE model, procurement of video cameras for interview rooms.  | <b>Outcome:</b> Alternative non-violent interrogation strategies to the use of torture used to obtain confessions, video surveillance as a deterrent.   |
|   | <b>Indicator of Impact:</b> <i>"We make a proper planning before interrogating the suspect. Proper knowledge of the crime scenario and questioning the witnesses has become our first duty as part of PEACE model so that we can properly assess the situation and get more precise information from the suspect."</i>   |   |

|  |  |  |
|--|--|--|
| <b>HRPF VW</b><br><b>HRPF WX</b><br><b>HRPF XY</b><br><b>HRPF YZ</b> | <b>Outputs:</b> a research study within Armed Police Force (APF) about the level of GBV within the APF itself and violence against women by APF on border security duties and a gender-based training manual on what is and is not acceptable in the way that APF treat female members of staff and also female suspects or witnesses. | <b>Outcome:</b> increased knowledge about the prevalence about GBV in the APF, a proposal for a Gender-based Unit submitted to the leadership of the APF, where it gained approval. At the time of writing this report, the proposal has now been submitted to the Ministry of Home Affairs. |
|  | <b>Indicator of Impact:</b> <i>"Towards the end of the project...they recommended that a separate gender unit should function as a specialised agency in gender issues in providing training, conducting research, generating materials and publications."</i>   |  |
| <b>HRPF ZZ</b>   | <b>Outputs:</b> training materials using an array of pedagogical techniques to provide alternatives to lecture-style learning environments.  | <b>Outcome:</b> trainers equipped to explore new interactive teaching techniques such as role-plays, drawing pictures, writing poetry, solving case problems, quiz contests and memory games.  |
|  | <b>Indicator of Impact:</b> "We incorporated as many techniques as we had learnt while training the new recruits. We played games, demonstrated arrests, used charts and also demonstrated a video during the sessions"  |  |
| <b>HRPF ZA</b>   | <b>Outputs:</b> production of a two-part short film using audio visual techniques such as dramatisation and footage of real life arrests, search and seizures and interrogations to teach human rights respecting practices.   | <b>Outcome:</b> New recruits in Special Task Force Battalion now see this film as part of their basic training.  |
|  | <b>Indicator of Impact:</b> "Lectures were too lengthy and monotonous sometimes. Audio-visuals were short and easy to understand. Further, we could miss some lectures if we were on duty but the audio visual can be watched again when we are off duty."   |  |
| <b>HRPF ZB</b>   | <b>Outputs:</b> Reward and punishment system and guidelines created including the exhibition of photos of high-performing police on the police station wall.   | <b>Outcome:</b> Police now have a tangible incentive to maintain high performance standards and are aware that poor performance, including reports of human rights violations, will result in failure to gain promotions.  |
|  | <b>Indicator of Impact:</b> "This system showcased how by rewarding the best police officers for their contribution towards human rights protection can provide positive motivation for other police personnel to aspire towards similar achievements."  |  |

Table 3: Nepal HRPFs Projects: Outputs, Outcomes and Indicators of Impact

(c) *Overall Findings:*

Considering the projects together, the following key findings were made:

- All the HRPFs implemented their projects in accordance with their project plans;
- The 12 projects involved 709 junior police officers as direct beneficiaries;
- The HRPFs and the junior officers involved reported strengthened commitment and capacity to protect human rights and in some cases prevention of torture; and
- The personnel involved have developed a greater understanding of human rights and the norms against torture and how to use this knowledge in their practical work.<sup>14</sup>

As detailed in *Issues Paper 7, Case Studies from Nepal and Sri Lanka: Human Rights Protection Facilitator Projects*, the HRPFs worked in quite different sites, ranging from small local border security battalions to the headquarters of the Armed Police Force in Kathmandu. The projects focused on improving and changing the

<sup>14</sup> This information is drawn from the Internal Evaluation Report – *Enhancing Human Rights Project* prepared by the Kathmandu School of Law, March 2015. This report has not been published.



internal workings and operations of the HPRFs organisations themselves. These improvements ranged across activities such as:

- Establishing new reward and punishment systems designed to incentivise respect for human rights;
- Conducting hands on training in non-violent methods for interviewing suspects and procuring video surveillance in interview rooms;
- Discovering, creating and practicing new effective pedagogic techniques for human rights for junior officers;
- Producing a documentary on human rights policing incorporating real police footage;
- Reframing public and police perceptions of drug abusers from criminals to individuals needing support;
- Developing guidelines specifying how each police rank should act when responding to crowd control and conducting practical training in these processes;
- Developing greater transparency within a police unit as a means of improving the culture of accountability and respect; and
- Conducting research into the incidence of gender based violence in the workplace, and developing a proposal for a new Gender Unit to the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Given the relatively modest level resources and short time available to undertake these projects, the list is extensive.

Looking at each HRPF project through this evaluation lens, it is clear that each project has to a certain degree achieved some immediate results on addressing the risk factors for torture within their part of the organisations that the HRPF identified. In some cases, the HRPFs themselves provided early indications of longer-term impacts of their projects. In the first instance these longer-term impacts took the form of the establishment of new operational tools, guidelines and policies that had now been integrated into the daily operations of their workplaces. In addition, they reported that the process of addressing the organisational problems that hamper personnel's ability to protect human rights or that increase the likelihood of torture occurring had brought about a broader attitudinal shift amongst their colleagues. In this sense, the process of bringing about small changes had also given them the experience that change is possible and that they can be agents of change.

#### *(d) Further Analysis and Reflection*

All HRPFs achieved the expected results of their projects to a certain degree and some projects also went on to serve the overall EHRP project objectives. The projects' real impact on the attitudes and behaviour of those police officers involved in the projects is suggested in the quotations above. How these changes in individuals' knowledge, attitudes and behaviours then goes on to translate into the reduction of risk factors of torture within their organisations more broadly is likely to be evident only over a longer timeframe.

The projects on the PEACE model, on increasing transparency in workplace culture and on creating reward and punishment systems linked with human rights are some examples of projects that directly and immediately targeted the operational activities of security personnel in line with the specific objective of the EHRP. On the other hand, in the case of projects such as those that sought to reduce gender based violence, increase police understanding of drug users, improve the levels of stress amongst police personnel, or enhance the capability of trainers to teach human rights more effectively, a minimal contribution to achieving the EHRP objectives can be seen in the short term. However, these projects specifically target systemic change in such a way that will be sustained in the longer term. For example, it is hoped that those officers that have benefited from a new understanding of drug addiction will ultimately be better positioned to play an instrumental role in managing drug-related crime and suspects in a more holistic and non-violent way over an extended period of time. It is therefore important to view the achievements of the HRPFs in terms of their impact within different timeframes.

### **Sri Lanka**

#### *(a) Summary of the process*

In Sri Lanka, the project team interviewed a total of 10 HRPFs as a number of HRPFs from the same workplaces had joined together to implement a joint project together. In some cases follow-up interviews were also held. Five focus group discussions were convened and where these were not possible, separate interviews were organised with both subordinates and superiors of the HRPFs to discuss how their projects were managed and received by their colleagues. Two factors hampered this evaluation process; first a number of the HRPFs were

not available to be interviewed due to transfers and other undisclosed reasons; and second, the announcement of the Presidential National Election on January 8 2015 meant that requests for interviews with HRPFs and their supervisors were declined due to their required attendance to official duties.

*(b) Summary of the Evaluation by project*

The HRPF projects in Sri Lanka are summarised in the table below along with the numbers of officers involved in each project.

| Sri Lanka                   |  |  |   |
|-----------------------------|--|--|---|
| HRPF                        | Service Place  | Project Title  | Numbers reached   |
| <b>HRPF AB<sup>15</sup></b> | Joint Services Language Training Institute, Kotmale  | Promoting Human Values and Cultural Understanding Among Trainees                                     | Phase I – 125 recruits<br>Phase II – 96 recruits<br>Phase III – 143 recruits  |
| <b>HRPF BC and HRPF CD</b>  | Air Force Head Quarters, Colombo   | Establishing a Human Rights Division in the Air Force  | 120 Air Force officers across ranks surveyed  |
| <b>HRPF DE and HRPF EF</b>  | Civil Security Department, Head Quarters and Kalpitiya Training Centre, Colombo/Kalpitiya          | Introducing a Human Rights Module to the Training of the CSD and train a team of trainers            | 25 CSD trainers trained<br>Potential to train 40,000 personnel over 3 years   |
| <b>HRPF FG and HRPF GH</b>  | Katana Police Academy, Negombo   | Establishing a Pool of Experts in Police Department in Training Methods                              | 25 police officers trained  |
| <b>HRPF HI</b>              | Coast Guard and of Nochchiyagama Vidyadarsa College, Anuradhapura                                  | Improving the Discipline of the Students by introducing a New System without Corporal Punishment     | 200 school children and 50 teachers were directly involved and benefitted by the project (not included in total)  |
| <b>HRPF IJ</b>              | Army, Combat Training School, Ampara   | Reducing stress levels amongst staff at the training school  | 50 trainers currently practicing  |
| <b>HRPF JK</b>              | Police Pahalagama Police Training College, Police Pahalagama Police Training College, Anuradhapura | Improving Mediation Skills of the Officers of Thalawa and Nochchiyagama Police Divisions             | TOT I – 35 Branch Officers in Charge and Trainers<br>TOT II – 30 Branch level Sergeant<br>TOT III – 80 members of Civil Protection Committees (representing 26 Civil Protection Committees) |
| <b>HRPF KL</b>              | Kalutara police training school  | Train the trainer for all the staff in the Kalutara police training school                           | TOT I – 32 lecturers and instructors<br>TOT II – 35 Training Instructors<br>TOT III – 30 Training Instructors   |
| <b>HRPF LM</b>              | Navy, Boosa Training Centre, Galle. Now based in Sri Nagar - Jaffna                                | Introducing Teaching Human Rights through Drama/Role Plays and introducing new teaching methods      | 50 trainers   |
| <b>HRPF MN</b>              | Navy Headquarters  | Training for sailors (sergeants) about handling disciplinary matters and complaints more effectively | 40 sergeants  |

Table 4: HRPF Project Summaries Sri Lanka

<sup>15</sup> The names of the HRPFs have been anonymised using sequencing from letters of the alphabet.

The table below sets out the outputs and outcomes of the HRPFs projects in Sri Lanka. Some statements from those HRPFs and junior officers are indicative of the potential longer-term impact of these projects.

| Internal Evaluation of HRPF Projects in Sri Lanka |  |  |
|---|--|--|
| HRPF AB   | <b>Output:</b> Cultural awareness training package including simulation exercise, field visits.  | <b>Outcome:</b> A new creative teaching methodology that promotes reconciliation and intercultural awareness as a means of protecting human rights in the security forces.   |
|   | <b>Indicator of Impact:</b> <i>"The team has observed a significant enhancement in the training capacity of HRPF AB who also served as a resource person in the workshops of three other HRPFs."</i>   |  |
| HRPF BC and CD                                    | <b>Output:</b> Research about levels of knowledge about human rights in the AirForce & submission of a proposal to create a Unit dedicated to managing human rights violations in the AirForce.  | <b>Outcome:</b> A new dedicated Unit (without jurisdiction to prosecute) proposed and provisionally approved to improve the management of human rights violations by the AirForce through increased prevention training. |
|   | <b>Indicator of Impact:</b> <i>"This is the only project that has achieved a structural change in a military setting."</i>   |  |
| HRPF DE and HRPF EF                               | <b>Output:</b> Production of a new Human Rights Module to the Civil Security Department (CSD) training and held 5 day train the trainer workshop on it.  | <b>Outcome:</b> New teams of trainers trained to deliver this module and increased time allotted for this module to fit within the broader CSD training.   |
|   | <b>Indicator of Impact:</b> <i>"At the outset DE seemed antagonistic and hostile towards human rights but a change in attitude was witnessed since. As the Head of Training responsible for the training of 45,000 officers, he sits in a very influential and important position."</i>          |  |
| HRPF FG and HRPF GH                               | <b>Output:</b> Production of a new Train the Trainer method and module for police trainees on human rights.  | <b>Outcome:</b> Alternative methods aimed at more effectively and creatively teaching human rights to police trainees are introduced into the Police Academy.  |
|   | <b>Indicator of Impact:</b> <i>"The post workshop evaluation clearly reflects the attitudinal shifts that have occurred and the transformational thinking patterns in needing to pass on the optimum to the trainees. The trainers acquired the need to stop "walking in the dark any more."</i> |  |
| HRPF HI   | <b>Output:</b> New school policies and activities including sports programs, meditation, environmental protection programs and new grievance systems.  | <b>Outcome:</b> Significant changes in the attitudes of teachers and students towards alternative non-violent forms of discipline.   |
|   | <b>Indicator of Impact:</b> <i>"At a community level, the Principal of another school in the area was impressed by the changes and wanted to carry out a similar project."</i>   |  |
| HRPF IJ   | <b>Outputs:</b> One day stress management workshop, quarterly stress release classes and consultations made available for officers experiencing hardship.  | <b>Outcome:</b> Enhanced relationships between supervisors and subordinates through the creation of an informal setting for trust-building, airing grievances and managing stress.                                       |
|   | <b>Indicator of Impact:</b> <i>"The HRPF was able to break out of the confines of the formal practice of teaching...to create informal platforms for the identification of problems and break certain myths about human rights being a new concept of little relevance to the forces."</i>       |  |

|         |   |  |
|---------|---|--|
| HRPF JK | <b>Outputs:</b> Two one-day workshops on mediation and investigation skills for Officers in Charge (OICs) and Sergeants.  | <b>Outcome:</b> A new approach to police management of community dispute settlements is taught with an emphasis on the protection of the rights of people involved.  |
|         | <b>Indicator of Impact:</b> <i>"Majority of the participants have mentioned that they thought about the skills they use daily in a different way...and that every difficult problem has a possible solution."</i>   |  |
| HRPF KL | <b>Outputs:</b> A five day training module that includes alternative training methods targeting better learning on human rights in police training schools & three week standardised program commissioned based on this workshop.   | <b>Outcome:</b> The promotion of the HRPF as a human rights expert and the three week standardised curriculum is a key institutional change, the open nature of consultation and grievance redress advocated in the training package is also a tangible transformation to the police training.   |
|         | <b>Indicator of Impact:</b> <i>"This program has resulted in a change in thinking from one of adherence owing to protection from the law to thinking about human rights as a problem-solving tool applicable universally."</i>  |  |
| HRPF LM | <b>Outputs:</b> Innovative human rights training curriculum produced with advice from educational specialist and used to train 24 navy officers.  | <b>Outcome:</b> Creative learning strategies are now being explored for human rights training and also for other forms of basic training. The allocation of time to human rights training has also increased to allow for more in depth discussion and learning.                                 |
|         | <b>Indicator of Impact:</b> <i>"At the outset of his trainings, he clearly points out the limited applicability of human rights within the navy and military. The rules of enlistment and internal hierarchies supersede the human rights standards generally taught at trainings."</i> |  |
| HRPF MN | <b>Outputs:</b> Design and implementation of a three day workshop for sergeants on how to manage community grievances properly  | <b>Outcome:</b> This training program addressed the new challenges facing navy officers in the post-war period particularly in dealing with complex ethical issues by drawing on Jataka stories (stories about the previous births of Buddha), the Bible and Panchathantra (Indian folk stories) |
|         | <b>Indicator of Impact:</b> <i>"The trainees were able to break away from the mentality of standardised one-size-fits-all solutions."</i>   |  |

Table 5: Sri Lanka HRPFs Projects: Outputs, Outcomes and Indicators of Impact

*(c) Overall Findings:*

Across the board, the evaluation team found that the HRPFs were unanimous in emphasising the value and significance for them of undertaking their projects; the level of neutrality and non-judgment with which the project team approached them; and particularly the recognition of the team's willingness to persist despite the constraints of working with military and police organisations in Sri Lanka.

That the majority of the HRPFs were trainers meant that the reach of the HRPFs projects was, at the outset, already set within the confines of training institutes. In this regard, the setting was not at the operational level as we had intended and as had been part of the Theory of Change. Being trainers themselves, the HRPFs also found our approach of deliberately moving away from traditional forms of training (their area of expertise) challenging. The connection between their projects and the objective of addressing risk factors for torture within their organisations was thus much weaker than in Nepal. The internal evaluators found that considerable progress had been achieved within this context, albeit limited when compared to the larger long-term objectives of the EHRP project. Nevertheless, and given these constraints, the evaluation indicated that the HRPFs emerged from this experience as newly recognised leaders with both the capacity, enthusiasm and commitment to influence attitudinal change in their workplace.

#### *(d) Further Analysis and Reflection:*

In Sri Lanka the HRPF internal evaluation revealed an entirely different set of findings and results to those from Nepal, although from the point of view of the lessons from the project, no less valuable. It is clear from both this evaluation process and our experiential knowledge, that the selection of the HRPFs almost exclusively from training institutes created an unforeseen difficulty in applying the intervention design. That is, the design of our intervention had a particular cohort of people in mind – those who were working in and had access to the operational side of law enforcement, but the personnel who came to work with us in Sri Lanka were trainers. As such, we had to work out how to translate our intervention plan for a different cohort of people whose access to the organisations was almost entirely through training institutions. Most HRPFs were able to contribute in some way to making improvements to the way in which human rights training is conducted, most commonly by using alternative pedagogic techniques to create more effective learning environments for their trainees. Nevertheless, their distance from the operational level of policing had the effect of shifting the HRPFs projects further away from the overall objective of the EHRP project. It is important to note, however, that most of the HRPFs in Sri Lanka did follow the Theory of Change logic we used in identifying weaknesses within their organisation – even if what was identified was simply that human rights training was absent, insufficient or ineffective.

As detailed in *Issues Paper 1, International Legal Frameworks and Existing Approaches to Preventing Torture*, our research revealed that on its own human rights training is not sufficient to address institutional factors promoting or failing to inhibit torture. Nevertheless, in the context of Sri Lanka, we found that in many parts of the security sector, there is little if any human rights training at all. Moreover, the training that does exist is highly abstract, disconnected from the realities of security personnel and their work and thus ineffective. In this context, working to improve or introduce training, especially where more substantive access was not available, was seen as a way of building a path towards more substantive organisational change. The evaluation revealed that at least two of the HRPFs were able to explain the Theory of Change of the project with a very high level of clarity. They, moreover, had a strong conceptual grasp of how this type of organisational change could be adapted to other professional settings where they may end up working. A seed for such organisational change was planted.

#### ***(ii) Findings from the External Evaluation***

The external evaluator's overall findings were that based on case studies, interviews and a review of project documentation. On the basis of these processes she concluded that many but not all of the HRPFs projects were likely to have contributed to the overall objective of the EHRP project at a localised level. She identified a smaller subset of projects that worked to specifically prevent and address torture and ill treatment.

In reaching these conclusions, the evaluation noted a number of factors that made it difficult to conclude that the projects had made a stronger contribution to the overall objectives of the EHRP:

- The HRPFS were able to successfully demonstrate delivered outputs but not necessarily outcomes;
- A substantial proportion of the HRPFs projects focused more generally on human rights and less so on directly addressing torture and ill treatment; and
- In the Sri Lankan context the focus of most of the HRPFs projects was largely on improving human rights training capacity.

In addition, taking into account the Contribution Analysis method that was used, she noted that other programs directed towards enhancing community policing were also underway in both countries and may have contributed to the work that the HRPFs did in these projects and to changes that were documented.

The external evaluation found that the numbers of beneficiaries of the HRPF projects (including the HRPFs themselves) greatly exceeded what had originally been envisaged. At the same time, she noted that there was considerable variance in the quality of the HRPFs projects and only partial evidence that the HRPFs projects had made a direct contribution to the overall objective of the EHRP projects.

In terms of numbers of people, the original plan was envisaged that we would work with 32 Human Rights Protection Facilitators across Sri Lanka and Nepal who would in turn reach a further 240 personnel through their projects. In total, 28 HRPFs completed projects (13 in Sri Lanka and 15 in Nepal), and these projects reached a further 1,505 security personnel (709 officers in Nepal and 796 security forces personnel in Sri Lanka).

While these numbers certainly look impressive, the evaluator noted that it was not in all cases clear that the projects had correctly identified or targeted situational factors that underpin or cause torture or ill treatment.

When this issue was further explored with the HRPFs, some were able to make these links. For example, the logic underpinning the projects that focused on reward and punishment systems was that creating an incentive system that rewards professional behaviour that respects and promotes human rights by police was a way of building in tangible incentive structures that will substantively encourage human rights compliant behaviour and inhibit violations. In this regard, as argues in *Issues Paper 2, Exploring the Root Causes of Torture*, incentive structures can have a significant impact on the extent to which personnel in security organisations respect human rights. At the same time, other HRPFs, for example those who worked on gender-based violence in the APF were less able to articulate the link between their project and risks of torture, even though they could do so in relation to human rights more generally.

In this regard, the external evaluator correctly concluded that only a portion of the projects directly targeted torture whereas all addressed human rights more generally. In this regard, she concluded that most projects improved local practices in a manner that addressed human rights but far fewer exhibited direct links to the specific objective of the EHRP to enhance the capacity of state officials to prevent torture.

#### *A final note on the HRPFs projects*

Returning to our ecological model, what the evaluations of the HRPFs' projects reveal is an overall notable change in the attitude and stated intentions of the individual HRPFs towards more human rights based law enforcement work. For the majority of HRPFs interviewed, there seemed to be enthusiasm and willingness for ongoing change of this kind to continue amongst their peers and in their workplaces and organisations as a whole.

On the whole, the HRPFs followed through on the process of identifying a weakness or risk factor for human rights violations within their organisation. Each HRPF devised his or her own strategy for addressing this by focusing on internal improvements within his or her workplace at an operational level. Not all HRPFs projects directly prevented torture, nor directly increased the capacity of security personnel to prevent torture as a specific human rights violation. In our view, this points to one of the most important difficulties that this new project approach presents. That is, its theory suggests that sustainable change must be embraced by personnel on the inside of the organisation. Yet enabling people within organisation to lead means that the changes they choose to make will not always be those that outsiders view as most effective in addressing human rights or torture. This could in part be because they are not committed to such change or because they are prevented from bringing about such changes. In this regard, and as discussed in *Issues Papers 5, Organisational and Normative Change in the Security Sector* and *Issues 6, From Structural Analysis to Structural Intervention*, the selection of the change agents is critically important.

Additionally, both the external and internal evaluations indicated that the sustainability of the HRPFs projects was undermined by the frequency of transfers of the HRPFs to other positions within the security forces. This was the case in both Nepal and Sri Lanka. On the one hand, HRPFs could potentially transfer their knowledge and ideas about organisational change to their new workplaces, thus further disseminate our approach. On the other, frequent transfer can in itself undermine the ability of local leadership to bring about organisational change.

What became apparent during the HRPFs projects was that this was the first time that they had been challenged to think creatively and innovatively about how organisational cultures, practices and structures could be changed. It was also the first time that they had been asked to consider how the structures, processes and cultures in their organisation either inhibit or support torture. Having the opportunity to map their identified problem to its roots at a micro-level and then devise and implement practical strategies and projects to overcome those problems marked a departure in the role that security personnel generally play in promoting human rights in the security sector. The exchange of resources and ideas between the project team as 'human rights people' and the HRPFs as 'security personnel' working together to ensure the HRPFs projects were implemented successfully presents a new model for positive collaboration that is worth exploring further. It is also clear that training alone is insufficient as a stand-alone approach to addressing entrenched human rights problems. Only by investing time, resources and confidence in the security personnel themselves (in tandem with training), are we able to assist them in making tangible changes possible at the operational level.

### C. Overall Evaluation Using the Logical Framework

The external evaluator also looked at the entirety of the EHRP against the results and indicators set out in the logframe. Below is an overview of the external evaluator's findings based on each expected result set out in the logframe and the indicators we devised to determine whether we had achieved each result.

*Expected Result 1: Increased global knowledge about the root causes of torture within military and police settings, including recognition and understanding of the effect of cultural and political variations.*

The specific OVIs envisaged in the logframe for this result were:

- A report on existing anti-torture training programs in militaries, police forces around the world;
- A "Multidisciplinary Report on Social & Cultural Factors that Support the Use of Torture in the Police, Armed Police and Military", translated, published and distributed globally to at least 500 institutions including research institutions, police, military, government and NGOs;
- A comprehensive action evaluation report, "Addressing the Root Causes of Torture: Research Report on Actions to Reduce and Prevent Torture in Police and Military settings in the Asia Pacific Region" including outcomes of police and military trainings, translated, published and distributed to at least 500 institutions;<sup>16</sup> and
- Outcomes of the research published as papers in academic journals and presented at academic conferences, both in the target countries and internationally.

The external evaluator found that Result One had been fully achieved. The evaluation report stated that, "The project has conducted extensive research into the root causes of torture in police and military settings and increased global knowledge on this important topic. It has conducted research on existing approaches to torture prevention in military settings, and had produced a body of research about the root cause of torture in police and military settings".

In coming to this conclusion, the report took into account the extensive research that had been conducted, the quality of the research and the subsequent production of a range of reports including the following:

- Review of Human Rights Training for Security Forces (providing an overview and critical analysis of human rights training for security sectors internationally);
- A set of nine *Issues Papers* setting out all aspects of the research including the empirical in-country research on Nepal and Sri Lanka and the more general research on the root causes of torture; and
- A number of academic publications and outputs that have been produced by the project team and broadly disseminated.

In each case, in excess of the projected 500 copies of the reports were disseminated (605 copies). In addition, a broader suite of research publications than had been envisaged was produced.

Moving from outputs to outcomes and impacts, the wide dissemination of these publications is indicative of broad and positive outcomes with respect to the increase in global knowledge about the root causes of torture. In addition, specific types of dissemination, for example to the Association of the Prevention of Torture and the Asia Pacific Forum have resulted in the research findings being taken up by civil society organisations working in the field of torture prevention and human rights, as well as by National Human Rights Institutions and security organisations (for example the APT has shared resources with the Indonesian military).

The evaluation specifically conducted on the research (see section on Delphi above) indicated that the research had been conducted with a high level of expertise, a sound research design and had made a unique and important contribution to the field in terms of the expanded understanding produced of the root causes of torture.

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<sup>16</sup> At the time of project design two reports— the multidisciplinary report on social and cultural factors and the comprehensive action evaluation report mentioned above – were envisaged as results for the dissemination of project knowledge. The content of these reports exist today, not as two separate reports but as a series of nine *Issues Papers*, for which this evaluation summary is one.

*Result 2: Increased capacity amongst the military, armed police and police of the target countries to reject torture as an acceptable behaviour, to act to prevent or curtail its use, and to embrace a rights-based approach to their dealings with detainees and suspects.*

The specific OVIs that were envisaged for this result in the logframe were:

- At least 32 (16 x 2 countries) police/military personnel report an increase in their capacity to act to prevent or curtail the use of torture through their role as Human Rights Protection Facilitators (HRPFs);
- At least 80% of the 32 HRPFs develop project plans to enhance human rights in their work places; and of those that develop project plans, at least 50% of these are implemented in their workplaces, reaching at least 240 personnel across the police and military in Nepal and Sri Lanka; and
- Qualitative research undertaken by project staff at the point of recruitment of HRPFs and point of conclusion of HRPFs' projects demonstrates an improvement in human rights awareness, knowledge, attitudes and behaviours of police and military personnel engaged with the project.

The external evaluation found that this result has been achieved at a local level, with some qualifications and limitations. A proportion of the HRPFs' projects were found to have contributed (in concert with existing programs), to the enhancement of the capacities of their colleagues in Sri Lanka and Nepal to prevent and address torture and ill treatment. In summary, the evaluation indicated that the Action had contributed to the capacity of the personnel directly involved in the activities to address and prevent torture and that this had also brought about changes at the organisational and structural level, but to a lesser extent. Examining this result against the metrics set out in the logframe, all target numbers were met, with the exception of a slightly lower number of completions of projects than expected (28 of 32). The anticipated number of security personnel involved in activities significantly exceeded the original projected number of 240, being 1,505 personnel (709 in Nepal and 796 in Sri Lanka).

In the case of this Action, we faced several impediments that caused significant delays. These included an election in Nepal and the demand from the Sri Lankan authorities that permission that had been given before the Action be reaffirmed mid way through.

*Result 3: Increased awareness amongst human rights advocates, academe and research institutions, police, armed police, military, government and NGOs from the Asia Pacific, about the root causes of torture and ill treatment including recognition and understanding of the effect of cultural and political variations.*

The Action logframe set out the following specific outputs under this result:

- Final comprehensive report on "Addressing the Root Causes of Torture: Research Report on Actions to Reduce and Prevent Torture in Police and Military settings in the Asia Pacific Region" translated published and distributed globally to at least 500 institutions including academe and research institutions, police, military, government and NGOs and published on project website;
- Research report incorporated into curriculum of Asia-Pacific Human Rights Master's program and offered to the Human Rights Masters network programs in Europe, South-Eastern Europe, Africa and Latin America; and
- Engagement of project partners in outreach activities including: articles published in academic and non-academic publications; media engagements; public speaking engagements; and op-ed pieces.

The external evaluation found that this result had been partially achieved. In making this finding it noted that the project produced a large body of research and engaged with a wide range of organisations. More specifically it pointed to:

- The significant body of research reports that had been produced and disseminated (See Result 1);
- The incorporation of the work of the Action in the curriculum of the Masters of Human Rights and Democratisation and sharing with other regional human rights programs through the Global Campus; and
- The engagement of partners in a range of outreach activities.



The external evaluator also concluded that it was difficult to find broad evidence of actual impact of the research in terms of increased awareness and understanding based on the research. Some evidence of an increase in awareness and understanding includes:

- The uptake of the research findings by the APT and the Asia Pacific Forum in their torture prevention project;
- The findings of the DELPHI evaluation where expert evaluators noted the usefulness of the research findings for other organisations working in the field;
- The interest in the results of the project shown by a range of other organisations that have received the publications including the Asia Foundation and Dignity.

Finding concrete evidence of increased awareness about the root causes of torture is difficult, insofar as it is difficult to trace how research publications and other material is actually picked up by other stakeholders and how they use it. In our view, the achievement of this Result will only be evident over the longer term as relevant stakeholders take up the findings of the Action on the root causes in teaching curricula and through the circulation and absorption of publications.

*Result 4: Increased sharing and development of information and resources between regional educational, governmental and non-governmental organisations in the Asia-Pacific region, concerning the prevention of torture and ill treatment.*

The logframe outlined the following OVIs for this result:

- At least 100 key stakeholders (including police and military from Sri Lanka and armed police and police in Nepal and representatives from at least an additional five countries) attend International Conference and participate in conference program;
- International research network on root causes of torture and ill treatment established, and program of work identified;
- 3 separate reports published (500 copies each) and distributed widely throughout the police/military and torture prevention networks, globally;
- Representation of government officials, police and military from at least 5 other countries in Asia at the International Conference;
- Invitations to showcase project in non-academic or academic settings (i.e. conferences, meetings with government officials, police and military).

Looking at the achievement of this result in terms of these OVIs, it was found that:

- The indicators with respect to the International Conference had been achieved and exceeded. Over 120 participants from 25 countries, including 17 countries with police and/or armed forces representatives present;
- The indicator concerning the establishment of the network had been partially achieved. A loose network has been established, and there are plans to establish a more formal network to be hosted by the Centre for the Study of Human Rights (CSHR), with a program of work established but this is still in development; and
- The indicators concerning the reports and showcasing the project had been achieved and exceeded as set out in Result 1.

In considering the achievement of this result, it is notable that the International Conference provided an opportunity for unprecedented interaction between CSOs and security sector organisations. The former Special Rapporteur on Torture, Professor Manfred Nowak, commented in his closing remarks to the Conference that he considered the event, which brought together a very broad range of stakeholders from normally polarised organisations, was unprecedented in the region. At the same time, the experience of the Conference was indicative of the significant impediments involved in sharing information and exchanging resources, especially across sectors. The difficulties experienced at the Conference (See *Conference Report: Human Rights and the Security Sector in the Asia Pacific*) and the conflict that ensued concerning the involvement of the Sri Lankan security sector and Sri Lankan NGOs was certainly an impediment to the development of a network. In our view, the development of such a cross sector network will require a significant amount of developmental work, especially if it is to be more than a superficial enterprise. This enterprise will be taken up by CSHR in the future but will require careful support for it to be effective as a network.

*Result 5: Funding and institutional support secured to continue and expand research into and implementation of actions preventing and reducing the incidence of torture and ill treatment in the police and military.*

The OVIs set out in the initial logframe for this result were quite narrow and specific, in particular:

- Commitment gained from at least three new potential partners to trial a holistic approach to human rights capacity building in their police/military institutions; and
- Funding secured to continue training police/military in partner countries and at least 3 new countries.

The project also planned to secure additional funding for a 10-year longitudinal research study to measure the program's effectiveness.

The external evaluator found that none of these OVIs are in evidence and the project team accepts this evaluation as correct. The project team did not dedicate efforts to expanding the project into new countries and did not seek additional funding for a ten-year longitudinal study on effectiveness. These activities were not feasible within the resources of the project given the demands in completing what were considered the more fundamental objectives of research and capacity building in the two target countries.

In our view, however, the achievement of this Result is also best evaluated using an additional indicator, which concerns evidence of activities that expand on the research and implementation of the Action in the two target countries. First, in Sri Lanka, the CSHR has been asked by the Sri Lanka Police to develop a new postgraduate program in human rights and policing drawing on the research and methodology developed by the Action to be taught in Sinhala and Tamil. The Police Department has agreed that it will send and fund between 75 and 150 personnel per year to participate in the course. The development of this course is currently underway.

Second, in Nepal, KSL has received funding from the Danish Government to undertake a four year project in collaboration with the Danish Institute of Human Rights and Danish Police to develop a project entitled *Enhancing Good Governance, Human Rights Protection and Law Enforcement Situation in Security Agencies and Criminal Justice Actors in Nepal*. The funding for this project is 90 million rupee. This project again specifically draws on the research and methodology developed by the Action and will involve capacity building activities directed towards torture prevention with the Nepal Police, Armed Police Force and District Forest Offices.

#### *Specific Objective*

The final piece of this evaluation against the logframe is whether or not the EHRP project achieved its Specific Objective: to develop the capacities of state officials to prevent and address torture and ill treatment within the police and military in Sri Lanka and the police and armed police in Nepal, thereby contributing to the prevention or reduction of acts of torture and ill treatment.

The OVIs set out for the Specific Objective were a mixture of narrow indicators and more capacious ones:

- Police and armed police and military leaders from Sri Lanka and Nepal (both civilian and uniformed) publicly pledge a commitment to a holistic rights-based approach to the prevention of torture and ill-treatment;
- Police and military amend their personnel training programs to incorporate this holistic rights-based approach to the prevention of torture and ill treatment; and
- Police and military personnel in the target countries implement organisational changes that reduce the risks of torture and strengthen practices and factors that support respect for human rights.

The external evaluator was able to determine that the first OVI was partially achieved based on an understanding that the police and military leaders from Sri Lanka and Nepal present at the International Conference publicly spoke about their endorsement of our project, their acceptance of the need to 'think outside the box' on torture prevention and their willingness to allow the HRPFs (all their subordinates) to present their projects to the wider international conference. A written or spoken formal public pledge did not, however, take place. In the lead up to the International Conference, the project team received cautionary advice that such a pledge would likely be judged by NGOs as empty rhetoric while not actually contributing to genuine change in the policies or actions of the forces.

As discussed above, the external evaluator agreed with the internal evaluators that there was substantial evidence indicating that police and military had, due to their involvement in the EHRP project, amended their personnel training programs to incorporate this new approach. In fact, this is perhaps the one indicator in which the Sri Lankan HRPFs made the most groundwork.

When looking at the final two indicators in the context of all the analysis of the evaluations above, it can be concluded that the specific objective of the EHRP was achieved at a local level. There is not yet sufficient evidence to see this result across the organisations involved. Nevertheless, we hope that over the passage of time both the amendments to the training programs of our HRPFs and the various other organisational changes the HRPFs created will persist, be expanded into other settings and workplaces elsewhere in Sri Lanka and Nepal and be taken up at policy levels.

## CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED FOR EVALUATING HUMAN RIGHTS PREVENTION PROJECTS

The different evaluations produced a number of important lessons from the project for the project team and we hope for others embarking on torture prevention research and intervention projects in the future. Linking these reflections back with the comments in Chapter One about the purpose and value of evaluations, it is important to recognise that evaluation findings about what did not work in a project provide invaluable information for the learning cycle of project development.

For the purposes of these final reflections, we divide these reflections into lessons related to the evaluation and project management process itself and lessons related to the substantive aspects of the project. For the purposes of this conclusion, we include only those that we see as most salient.

### *(i) Lessons related to developing and delivering a sound evaluation process*

Our experience of conducting an evaluation on a multi-layered and complex project reinforced a number of the principles and practices of evaluation discussed in Chapter One of this *Issues Paper*, specifically:

- Think carefully about the evaluation plan from the outset of the project planning and seek to include a full range of measurements that will reach the different aspects of what you are setting out to achieve;
- Continue to revisit the evaluation plan to check back on whether you are implementing the project in a way that can be evaluated;
- Adjust your evaluation strategy and OVIs as the project develops. Logframes and other project management tools should not be seen as fixed or static but need to move with the project;
- Be aware of the difficulties of evaluating impacts, especially where the changes expected are qualitative and relational;
- Ensure that all members of the project team and key stakeholders have a firm understanding of the evaluation plans early on in the project so that they are building this into their work plans and the way they carry out and document projects; and
- Keep excellent records! Particularly if you are trying to compare a particular factor across time, it is important to ensure that you have consistent measurement tools and that you keep all records of any measurements you take including qualitative ones such as interviews.

### *(ii) Lessons related to the prevention of torture and working with the security sector*

The lessons set out here specifically relate to the particular approach taken in this project, which was to seek out root causes and to address those root causes within security organisations themselves. The lessons we see as most important include the following:

- Addressing systemic factors that underpin or cause torture within security organisations in the absence of coordinated strategies addressing factors in other parts of the overall system (most importantly political and cultural factors) will have limited effects. Especially where there is a high degree of political interference with security organisations, working at the political level is critical (although often the most difficult);
- Working with security sector organisations on bringing about systemic changes in those organisations requires high level support as well as support from a number of key people in relevant parts of the organisation. Because there is likely to be ambivalence to such change if not active resistance to change, the process of developing collaborative change processes needs to be understood as one that takes place over the long term;
- If a 'change agent' approach is taken, then the personnel from security organisations who are identified as change agents need to have appropriate capacities and be appropriately positioned in the organisation. That is, they need to have an in principle commitment to the process (which does not mean there will not be differences or disagreements) and they need to have sufficient authority to be able to bring about change;
- When working in contexts where there is significant hostility to human rights and to those associated with them (NGOs, INGOs and so on) adequate time needs to be built into a project to develop sufficient trust and basic agreement to provide a foundation for more complex project work. Where deep disagreements are not dealt with, activities can be deflected or redirected in a way that undermines the core objectives of the project;

- There is an unavoidable tension between recognising that change needs to be driven from within security organisations on the one hand and, on the other, ensuring that the changes that are effected are the ones that outsiders wish to bring about. Erring too much on the side of giving over 'control' to the change agents on the inside can result on serious compromise of the objectives; erring too much on the side of control from the outside can reduce buy-in, ownership, sustainability and ultimately the actual take up of change in the organisation; and
- When working on the assumption that human rights are universal, it is important to be aware of prevailing societal norms and the way in which certain forms of violence may be normalised and generally accepted. While important not to lose sight of the underlying human rights principles of the project, it is also critical to recognise how and why security personnel hold the views and take actions that they do. Such recognition is not the same as acceptance, but it can form a foundation for working out how to navigate and create productive conversations about protecting human rights that may bring about sustainable change.

In conclusion, our experience has been that attempting a new approach in an already contentious space is one that presents a range of challenges. It requires the willingness to suspend assumptions about the correct way to 'do human rights' and also assumptions about the security sector, albeit for different reasons. It also requires the discomfort of not having surety of success. Nevertheless, the impetus to address a heinous violation that remains entrenched across the globe ought to embolden us to develop and test new daring ideas and strategies. In doing so, we may identify productive approaches, even if we are unlikely to achieve immediate success. Our aim in presenting an honest and thorough evaluation of the EHRP project is that the learning from our work can be incorporated into future projects of this kind and contribute to forging new paths for others to explore.





